Tensions Flare as NATO leaders focus on the “systemic challenge” posed by China

Background

NATO leaders attend the 2021 NATO summit in Brussels, Belgium. Source: Office of 10 Downing Street, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. 

On the heels of the 47th G7 summit in Cornwall, United Kingdom, western leaders made their way to Brussels for the 31st NATO summit on June 14, 2021. Together with the G7, this gathering of NATO heads of state and governments can be seen as the other major headliner for a Europe-wide series of meetings throughout mid-June, which spanned a multitude of the bilateral and multilateral relationships that make up “the West.” 

While NATO summits have been held semi-regularly throughout the 2010s - every year or two years - NATO summits are not regular meetings. Rather, they are held as needed during “important junctures in the Alliance’s decision-making process.” A NATO summit is held for such events as a major shift in NATO’s policy or security stance, the invitation of a new member into the Alliance, or during tense moments on the world stage. 

Thus, it is notable that, like the G7, the NATO summit devoted a considerable portion of the agenda towards China, as evidenced by the post-summit communique; three of the seventy-nine points in the document focus on China. Compare this to the communique that came out of NATO’s 2019 summit in London, which has only a passing, one-line mention of China. 

However, it also must be noted that Russia received considerably more attention than China in the 2021 communique; nineteen points mention Russia, including many points that are solely dedicated to NATO’s security and diplomatic stance towards Russia. Thus, it can be concluded that while China was not the singular focus of the 2021 NATO summit, China certainly received far more attention from the Alliance as compared to years past. 

Point 3 argues that NATO faces “multifaceted threats, systemic competition from assertive and authoritarian powers,” explicitly naming China as one of these powers; it notes that “China’s growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.”

Point 55 further elaborates on this, claiming “China's stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security.” It goes on to name specific aspects of China’s behaviour on the world stage:

“China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a larger number of sophisticated delivery systems to establish a nuclear triad.  It is opaque in implementing its military modernisation and its publicly declared military-civil fusion strategy.  It is also cooperating militarily with Russia, including through participation in Russian exercises in the Euro-Atlantic area.  We remain concerned with China’s frequent lack of transparency and use of disinformation.”

Finally, point 56 notes that “NATO maintains a constructive dialogue with China where possible” and calls upon China to engage in meaningful dialogue with NATO members on issues such as climate change. 

A harder-line NATO stance towards China? 

We can situate this NATO communique within the context of a larger anti-China thrust that came out of this series of meetings. This was driven by the Biden’s administration's desire to rally and unite its democratic allies, particularly in Europe, on a variety of issues, including taking a stronger stance towards China. Just as the G7 focused on the economic and developmental aspect of this goal, proposing an alternative to China’s famed Belt and Road Initiative, the NATO summit focused on defining its own security stance towards China. 

The communique’s strong language on China is the most conspicuous result of the NATO conference. The naming of China as a “systemic challenge” attracted the most attention from observers; it was this phrase that graced world media headlines, after all. Many of those observers note that this communique marks a major shift in policy by NATO and its members towards a more assertive security approach with respect to China. For example, Steven Erlanger and Michael D. Shear point out that the post-summit communique lays out a significant change in NATO’s geographical focus; the alliance, traditionally concerned with the Cold War axis of Europe and North America, has now turned its attention to China and the wider Pacific. 

This is not a sudden, singular shift in security policy towards China and the Asia-Pacific, however. As Meia Nouwens at the International Institute for Strategic Studies argues, the strong China stance taken by the 2021 communique is built on previous statements by NATO Secretary General Jens Stolenberg and the NATO 2030 Reflection Group report. Moreover, Neuvens points out that, although China is an important part of the communique, Russia receives far more attention (she notes that Russia is mentioned 63 times, as compared with China’s 10 mentions). 

Finally, it is worth noting that NATO comprises a far broader coalition than a group like the G7, being composed of 30 member states with varying degrees of hostility or cooperation with China. Certainly, NATO leaders like President Biden have pushed the idea that “NATO stands together” on issues like China; the fact that the communique had to be agreed upon by all 30 leaders is undeniable evidence of efforts towards a united front on China.

Despite the seeming unified rhetorical hardline during the summit and within the communique, some observers question how united NATO will really be in a more aggressive security policy with respect to China. Claudia Major, writing for Carnegie Europe, notes that while “[t]here is agreement among the thirty allies that China matters as a systemic challenge...  there is less consensus on what an answer entails in terms of action, instruments, and geographic reach.” Major points out that many European nations are reluctant to risk their economic ties with China in pursuit of a more aggressive foreign policy stance towards China. This potential for disunity among NATO leaders was apparent during their press conferences after the summit. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in her remarks after the NATO summit, argued NATO needed “balance” with respect to China and that China was both a rival and a partner. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that NATO should not “bias” their relationships with China and that the Alliance should not be “distracted” from other challenges. 

China’s reaction

As with the G7’s announcement of B3W, China offered a sharp reaction to the NATO summit and the strong language contained within the communique. China’s diplomatic mission to the EU gave China’s official response, posting a statement on Twitter hours after the summit concluded. The statement accused NATO of “slandering China’s peaceful development and misjudging the international situation and its own role. It represents a continuation of the Cold War mentality and bloc politics.” 

The statement then goes on to address specific points made by the NATO communique, claiming that “China is committed to a defense policy that is defensive in nature”; criticizing the United States for its high military expenditures and worldwide military base network; it goes on to defend China’s nuclear weapon policy. The mission concludes by stating “China urges NATO to view China’s development in a rational manner, stop hyping in any form the so-called ‘China Threat’...”

Chinese state media published similar messages criticizing NATO and the result of the NATO summit. Chen Weihua, chief of the China Daily EU Bureau, echoed China’s criticism of NATO’s tougher stance, arguing the “NATO Summit in Brussels has sent a disturbing message on China, a message that could trigger an arms race and undermine world peace.”  A Global Times editorial took aim at NATO unity claiming “Most of NATO member states want to handle the differences with China through political and diplomatic means. “ and that “The future of Europe is not subordinate to the US only to get a small slice of cake from Washington’s hegemony. Europe needs to be able to control its own destiny.” 

Beyond the typical war of words between the West and China, however, the NATO summit was closely linked with an incursion of twenty-eight Chinese air force aircraft into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ) on June 15, 2021. The timing of such a show of force - the day after the conclusion of the NATO summit - meant many observers drew a direct connection between NATO’s stronger language and the incursion into Taiwan’s ADIZ. 

What does this mean for Canada?

Canada, as one of the founding members of NATO, plays an important role in any action taken by the alliance. Any significant shift in NATO’s security posture towards China is linked closely with Canada’s security policy. 

On the part of Canada, Prime Minister Trudeau echoed the lines struck by the communique but emphasized the need for a balanced approach. The Prime Minister stated the NATO allies were “more united than ever” on issues such as the “strong arm” tactics of China, but that China would need to be included in discussions on global issues such as climate change. 

As with the B3W initiative announced by the G7, NATO’s new security policy towards China remains imprecise. While NATO has agreed that China presents a “systemic challenge,” so far, these are merely words on the page of a communique. Any resultant changes in the specific security or defense policies by NATO member states remain to be seen. As Nouwens argues, the communique “”signalled a strengthened consensus among NATO members on the various challenges that China poses. They must now turn this consensus into a coherent strategy, and act on it.” Observers will no doubt be watching closely the China policies of all NATO member states - including Canada - to see how the strong words that came out of this NATO sumit translate into the China policies of individual nations.