The opinions expressed by authors in these commentaries do not necessarily represent the views of the China Institute or the University of Alberta.
Triggering Withdrawal
Today, every state in the international system has a stake in the nuclear arms debate, especially given the destructive power of nuclear weapons that exist in a variety of forms. As a result, and not surprisingly, many states, notably Brazil, South Africa, South Korea and Norway (both of which are in nuclear alliances), Sweden, and several former Soviet states, among others, remain advocates of nuclear non-proliferation and global nuclear disarmament, opposing the development of nuclear arsenals and ongoing experimentation with nuclear weapons for offensive purpose. Others remain advocates of limited nuclear proliferation, posing continued challenges in terms of maintaining the global security environment and the nuclear balance.
The Trump administration's decision to pull out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty did not come out of nowhere, though some sources claim that it took US allies by surprise. An announcement made by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in February 2019 that the US will officially suspend its obligations under the INF treaty, citing restraint placed on the US while Russia's routine treaty violation practices. The US administration brought forward its concerns about the treaty under the Obama administration, leading to a move that renders the landmark arms-control and disarmament treaty comparably short-lived. In June 2019, a bill on the suspension of Russia's participation in the INF Treaty was introduced in the State Duma in Moscow. Russian President Putin followed the delivery of that news not long afterward with his statement that, '[a]s of August 2, 2019 the INF Treaty no longer exists', emphasizing that, 'US colleagues sent it to the archives, making it a thing of the past'. US allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) issued a statement in which they fully supported the US' decision and recognized Russia's actions, including the deployment of SSC-8 missiles, as the cause of the treaty's collapse.
The INF's termination has spawned fears by arms control organizations and experts, and unsettling words by President Putin that the world may eventually or even soon fall into a new arms race. It is clear that such a race would involve the US and the Russian Federation, possibly even involving China, risk a similar situation to that of the 1960s when the world came closer to nuclear exchange than any other time. The absence of the INF opens the way for the US to develop new missiles and delivery systems. The Pentagon has recently stated that it will pursue the development of new systems that would have been prohibited under the terms of the INF, and has asked for funding to do so.
INF Treaty History
Unable to foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union, the INF Treaty was borne out of concern about the potential for nuclear war and the devastating impacts of nuclear weapons, which have been amassed in colossal quantity. The abrupt end to the 45-year ideological standoff was largely an unexpected and shocking event. Decades of running the gamut of nuclear exchange, the US and the Soviet Union under Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty in December of 1987, obliging both superpowers to eliminate all nuclear and conventional ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles able to operate between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. For the US, these included the Pershing 1a, Pershing II, and the BGM-109G. For the Soviets, restrictions were placed on the SS-23 Spider, SS-12 Scaleboard, SS-4 Sandal, SSC-X-4 Slingshot, SS-5 Skean, and the SS-20 Saber. The INF Treaty did not place any restrictions on missiles launched from the sea.
The signing of the INF Treaty signaled a massive shift in the Cold War and played no small part in the reduction of tensions and tempering of the threat of war. The INF was the first treaty ever formulated that effectively prohibited and an entire group of nuclear weapons and ease the threat of war in Western Europe. Russian initiative played its part in widening the scope of the treaty to cover missiles of shorted ranges, and Moscow even ended up destroying more than double the number of missiles than Washington over the next two decades.
Impacts on Non-Proliferation
The prospect of multilateralizing the INF has been lost as a result of US withdrawal and Russia confirming the treaty's passing. The treaty did in fact present itself as a useful framework for non-proliferation and hopes for a sustainable peace. The INF carried significant success given the more than 2,500 missiles that were destroyed following its signing. This monumental task took place in just four years while, at the same time, both sides were able to observe what the other was doing. Having moved into a world of multipolarity and one in which numerous states are in possession of nuclear weapons, there was a need as well as an incontrovertible purpose for the treaty that finds its roots in the bipolar world.
Termination and Impact
President Trump made his intentions to pull out of the treaty clear on October 20, 2018, while attending one of his campaign rallies. Repeated claims that Russia was violating the treaty established the justificatory basis for the US, as a major nuclear non-proliferation norm champion, to withdraw and pursue a different course. This point of view had fed a political debate between political figures from both countries, in which the US, Russia claims, violated the treaty's core conditions through the deployment of missiles and even through the development and deployment of heavy combat drones such as the Predator B (MQ-9 Reaper). Russia has also developed and test-flown its own heavy drone while China's movement in the drone realm has been well-documented with its Ch-5 Rainbow performing comparably well. Chinese drones have been in sizable quantity and used in combat operations by countries that have purchased them. In this, both Russian and US policies served to destabilize the offence-defense balance that has taken some time to establish in the post-Cold War period.
INF Treaty violation is driven by discrepancy over the actual range of the Russian tested guided missile, the Novator 9M729 (NATO, designation SSC-8), which the US has claimed blatantly violated the production and possession clause concerning ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). US missile deployments in Poland and Romania were interpreted analogously as direct violations of the INF Treaty as far back as 2002. Dialogue between the US and Russia centers predominantly on triviality and the exchange of heated allegations, and has taken place amid moves by both sides to respond on a practical level.
Following the withdrawal of the US, only one arms control agreement, the 2009-drafted and 2010-signed New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), between the US and Russia remains in place. But clouds also loom on the horizon with respect to that treaty, of which National Security Advisor John Bolton expressed, may not be extended beyond its February 5, 2021 expiration date. Despite his statement about New START, no firm decisions have been made just yet that would rule out its extension to 2026. Without extension, three major countries, the US, Russia, and China, along with France, the United Kingdom (UK), Pakistan, and India (the non-declared nuclear weapons states, Israel and North Korea are in a special category) would be free to forge ahead with their nuclear weapons as they like.
Concern has been raised that the INF Treaty tied the US to a commitment with a country that has little hope for matching US economic output and military investment, while the US' major contender across the Pacific operates with fewer institutional restrictions placed on its nuclear development further still. Accordingly, any such arms buildup or race that may occur in the Asia-Pacific region would require - from the standpoint of the Trump administration - the US to be freed of all restrictions. This is precisely what the US' departure from the INF has achieved. At the same time, Russia has been free of its obligations under the INF Treaty as well.
China has been successful in its indigenous missile building program, which has altered the defense balance in the Asia-Pacific realm. Having never been constrained by the INF Treaty, China has successfully developed a wide-range of missiles and is now able to threaten and counter US' military superiority in the region. With Sino-American competition in the Asia-Pacific region increasing, the US now likely sees itself constrained by a treaty that was developed with a bipolar world in mind, not one in which multipolarity is the norm.
Although Russia violated the terms of the treaty when Moscow deployed a cruise missile, which followed with accusations that Russia further developing weapons, the US' abandonment of the treaty may be interpreted as an asymmetrical response to frustrations with the arrangement. There has been some talk about a new deal, though utterance of both Russia and China needing to agree to the terms leaves any such talk as little more than paying lip-service to the idea. The likelihood of a new agreement coming into force remains exceedingly low with numerous conditions acting as, at least for the time being, almost insurmountable obstacles. Foremost, the US would need to fund the program - something the very administration that pulled out of the treaty is unlikely to back and for which it is unlikely to find the requisite support. Furthermore, China rejected an invitation to dialogue about the future of nuclear arms control with both the US and Russia in July 2019.
European leaders from countries with divergent attitudes toward security and their perception of Russia - notably Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states in contrast to the older members of the European Union (EU) - would need to agree on the establishment of new installations and accommodate US missile deployments in a region already sharply divided on a surfeit of issues of a political and security nature. Some countries might open their doors more to American missiles than others, but generally-speaking the US is unlikely to see their missiles greeted with open arms by the much of the European community.
A unified front comprised of Xi and Putin against Trump suggests that the possibility of a new agreement is Lilliputian in comparison with the possibility of multilateral initiatives. Heightened suspicion between the US, Russian, and China is a major ingredient causing or tempting any one of these states to cheat the treaty, veer, or institute an entirely new missile development and development trajectory. In any event, the US having being the first to withdraw provides China with little incentive for entertaining talks of a new and enhanced agreement - China at this point has no desire to be obstructed in its politics or business of national security, especially given the current tensions between the US and China, and after bearing witness to the incumbering conditions of an INF Treaty, which ultimately collapsed.
On numerous occasions, China has noted that both the US and Russia are further along the path of military development, and that the country has great deal of catching up to do. Subsequently, any moves to artificially restrict China's military development could be viewed as a Western-centric security approach set atop frail foundations dialogue and negotiation.
The US and China Post-INF
In a post-INF world, one might expect US missile deployment activity to focus on China rather than the US' Cold War nuclear rival. Altogether, as optimism about reaching a new agreement diminishes significantly, an apt calculation is that Russia, China, and the US will likely become more determined to go their separate ways. Rather problematically, it is likely that all three countries, during this tumultuous time, would find a great deal of support within their respective domestic realms. Republican party cohesion within the US remains strong and the US president continues to enjoy a significant degree of support, suggesting that many of his foreign policy moves appeal to the majority of US citizens. Domestic support is less of a concern for China and Russia, both of which have less need to convince their domestic constituencies.
At the same time, we cannot ignore Iran and North Korea - two crucial elements in the US security calculus in the Middle East and East Asia, in addition to its own national security and relations with those countries. Both countries have shown heightened signs of aggressive policy and commitment to their own security arrangements. North Korea possesses active and advanced nuclear weapons ballistic missile programs, and has come in the form of further nuclear weapons tests in recent years and multiple missile tests in 2019 alone, violating UN resolutions. North Korea may possess around 20-30 nuclear weapons with the potential for doubling and even tripling that number in the coming years. In addition to its nuclear stockpiles, North Korea's other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that tend to draw considerably less discussion, including stockpiles of chemical and biological agents. These agents can be contained within North Korea's maturing missile systems and delivered to targets abroad.
While China's missile cache during the last decade of the Cold War was viewed as miniscule and innocuous, its current advanced collection of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles is deserving of renewed analysis and debate. Today, China's missiles have the ability to strike the US' closest allies, including Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, India, and Thailand, in addition to US possessions in those regions. However, a cautious approach to missile deployment in the Asia-Pacific region should be adopted in an effort not to bring about an unwelcome response by China, even if it were to be partially warranted. From the position of China, the end of the INF Treaty points to a need to amplify its existing arsenals. Even though China's missiles have the capacity to reach with precision-point accuracy numerous US and US-ally targets, China's arsenal remains relatively modest. Whereas US and Russian 2018 inventories contained 6,550 and 6,850 missiles, respectively, China's missile fleet ranked fourth in the world, with approximately 300 missiles although that number is probably going to double over the next decade. The US and Russia both share concerns about China's missile development, representing, though for a brief period, an opportunity for both powers to dialogue over a matter of mutual concern.
Changing conditions are becoming increasingly supportive of the acquisition and development of new missiles and missiles systems, but not in the manner seen between the Soviet Union and the US in the form of an arms race. Fears over such developments remain largely speculative. Russia currently faces economic restraints that would essentially preclude it from competing quantitatively against the US in an arms race and to attempt to do so would repeat a departure from rational decision making.
A significant difference between the security landscape of the Cold War and that of today is the technological options presently available. Far more advanced military technology implies that arms competition between two more countries can present itself in a variety of forms - technologies that enable the use of supersonic/hypersonic missiles and missile-firing platforms, or drones moving stealthily and discharging from under water.
While August 2019 marked a potentially fundamental shift in (nuclear) (non-)proliferation, a look at the long-term effects within the context of innovative technology and outer space as an emerging military realm are well-warranted. Efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons on earth have taken two steps back while states look fervently into the future with the view to projecting their influence beyond the planet. Existing international treaties and principles, foremost the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, governing space-related activities may not be able to prevent the placement of WMDs in space or preclude states from undertaking military activities high above.
Given that the INF Treaty was decades old and rooted in a different time, it thus required major revamping to account for state actors that were not entered into the security calculus decades prior. Missed opportunities associated with INF 1.0 might have served as a possible blueprint of an INF 2.0, an idea that is unlikely to come to fruition and is wishful thinking at this particular point in time, mainly given the potent mutual hostility that has swept average citizens and political figures in the US, China, and Russia - three countries that matter the most when it comes to addressing the challenges associated with nuclear weapons proliferation.
Tobias Burgers is an assistant professor at the Cyber Civilization Research Center, Keio University.