Johannesburg and Beyond: Implications of the 2023 BRICS Summit for the Evolving Global Political and Economic Landscapes

The opinions expressed by authors in these commentaries do not necessarily represent the views of the China Institute or the University of Alberta.

The recent BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, represented the 15th annual gathering of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. These countries, which have been meeting formally since 2010, represent roughly 40% of the world’s population and approximately a third of global gross domestic product (GDP).

While the summit exposed long-standing fault lines between each member state’s perception of the West, the bloc’s historic expansion highlighted its political and economic diversity while raising several questions for Canada’s Indo-Pacific and broader global strategies. 

Heading into the summit, the five countries, in addition to 40 observer nations, remained divided on several critical issues, including the bloc’s relationship with other global governance venues such as the G7 and the potential for expansion

While both Russia and China expressed an implicit interest in constructing an alternative international system to counter the perceived Western dominance of the current global political and financial architecture, both India and Brazil have repeatedly signalled their closeness to the West, with Brazilian president Lula da Silva publicly downplaying such sentiments during the summit. Despite Vladimir Putin’s steadfast support for Russia’s war effort, which prevented the Russian president from travelling to South Africa for the summit due to an outstanding arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC), BRICS member states have responded with varying degrees of support for Moscow amid the invasion of Ukraine. While Beijing has been slightly more open in its support of Russia during the war, particularly in echoing Russian propaganda claims and providing diplomatic support, South Africa has primarily focused on attempting to highlight its neutrality by presenting a ceasefire proposal to Russia and co-leading an African conflict mediation delegation with Egypt. Furthermore, both Russia and Brazil have openly pushed for the bloc to reduce its reliance on the US dollar for use in trade and investment, though this proposal lacks majority support.

These tensions were on full display during the summit, particularly in the speeches delivered by each leader throughout the event, along with informal sessions conducted along the sidelines of the gathering. During his speech, delivered remotely via video, Vladimir Putin accused the West of provoking Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, along with prompting global hunger through a coordinated sanctions regime targeting Russian grain and fertiliser sales. Though less explicit, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech, delivered by Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao, similarly focused on critiquing Western hegemony, and implicitly accused the United States of weakening emerging markets and seeking to contain China’s rise. This address was followed by meetings between Xi and the leaders of Cuba, Ethiopia, Senegal, and Bangladesh, which primarily focused on developing closer economic and political ties. However, despite the efforts of Russia and Brazil to push the bloc to shift away from using US dollars to conduct international transactions, the summit’s discussions instead focused on conducting trade using each member’s local currency, signalling a limit to BRICS’s capacity to completely separate from the Western financial system.

Furthermore, prior to the summit, the bloc had seen internal struggles over the possibility of expansion, despite strong interest from a host of developing countries. While China had supported expansion, both India and Brazil had been more cautious due to a combination of tensions between New Delhi and Beijing and concerns over further erosion of its power within the organisation, respectively. Though India has officially continued its long-standing policy of non-alignment and worked to settle its border dispute with China, New Delhi has also continued to reach out to the West, particularly in its recent decision to join the Quad, an Indo-Pacific security dialogue involving the United States, Japan, and Australia.

The addition of six new members will have a significant influence on Canada’s broader foreign policy and its relationship with China, including energy politics, multipolarity, and New Delhi’s relationship with both Ottawa and Beijing.

With the addition of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, BRICS now includes a significant portion of OPEC, placing the bloc closer to the centre of global energy politics. While Saudi Arabia and Iran were bitter foes for decades, having fought proxy conflicts in Yemen and Syria in recent years, a recent Chinese-mediated rapprochement between the two powers led to the restoration of bilateral diplomatic ties between them. In light of joining BRICS, Saudi Arabia, a major oil producer, could be more assertive in its energy strategy and less willing to accommodate Western economic interests - as it often has in the past - thus potentially jeopardising Western access to Saudi oil. Arguably, this would represent the continuation of a trend that has recently been seen in Saudi statecraft, with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman increasingly focusing on asserting Saudi independence from the US. This potential Middle Eastern energy supply problem would only be exacerbated by long-standing sanctions against Iran, another major oil-producing country. This possible paradigm shift in global energy markets carries significant implications for Western energy security, and could lead to an increase in reshoring or “friendshoring” of oil production for Western markets. Ottawa should take note of this possibility, as Canada, a major oil-producing country, could help to fill the gap in energy demand, especially in European Union nations that have already struggled with energy supply issues following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

While several leaders referenced the concept of “multipolarity” during the summit in seeking to draw a contrast with the bipolarity of a “Cold War 2.0”, alignment within the bloc appears relatively inconsistent. However, by accepting a host of emerging and established powers across the Global South, BRICS has enhanced its geoeconomic and geostrategic influence.

Although some Western commentators have argued that BRICS expansion is a sign of a coalescing anti-Western bloc, it appears that significant divisions remain between the organisation’s original members. Although Russia and China expressed anti-Western sentiment to varying degrees throughout the summit, Brazil and India have sought to hedge their allegiances by maintaining relatively strong ties to Washington. Furthermore, despite the US’ dismay with South Africa’s refusal to distance itself from Russia, the Biden administration has continued to fund the country’s energy transition. Moreover, of the recent additions to the bloc, Saudi Arabia and Egypt maintain strong historical ties with the West, while the US designates Argentina as a major non-NATO ally. Rather than acting as a harbinger of emerging bipolarity within the international system, BRICS represents an alignment built on mutual economic interests and shared developmental goals.

However, despite these countries’ behaviour, the bloc’s expansion offers a potential glimpse at the future of the international system, particularly in the inclusion of Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, and the UAE. While Argentina may yet leave the bloc following the potential election of Javier Milei - which would signal potential institutional weakness within the bloc - Ethiopia and Egypt are either currently, or poised to become, significant regional powers due to their strong economies, favourable demographic trends, military strength, and global diplomatic engagement.^{[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]} Iran possesses a very well-established regional alliance network with robust military capabilities and a geostrategically important location. Furthermore, the inclusion of Egypt and the UAE places both the crucial shipping routes of the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz under the influence of BRICS, which significantly enhances the bloc’s geoeconomic leverage. With China’s naval capabilities extending further into the Indian and Pacific Oceans, BRICS nations now have significant influence over three of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints - the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Malacca Strait. Undoubtedly, these developments significantly magnify the geoeconomic and geopolitical strength of BRICS, carrying far-reaching economic and security implications for Western policymakers. The increased strength of BRICS in the wake of the Johannesburg summit indicates that it would be far less costly for Western policymakers to find areas of converging interests to cooperate with the bloc, as opposed to exacerbating pre-existing tensions with it.

Moreover, the summit also had direct implications for Canada’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific region. In the aftermath of Johannesburg, it remains clear that India’s relationship with both China and Canada remains at a crossroads, with New Delhi seeking to manage its relationship with its larger and more powerful neighbour while Ottawa attempts to expand relations through its Indo-Pacific strategy. While India may express interest in growing its trade relationship with Canada and expanding resilient supply chains and concern over China’s growing influence, its relationship with Beijing remains multifaceted and built on areas of mutual interest. As such, Canada’s approach to India cannot solely focus on balancing against Beijing, which would appear largely counterproductive, but rather on building out its relationship with a dynamic emerging economic power that has deep and progressively expanding people-to-people ties with Canada, and has expressed a genuine interest in working to develop high quality infrastructure in the region.

While the announcements of the Johannesburg summit continue to reverberate across the bloc, particularly amongst the new members, the next BRICS summit is slated to be hosted in the Russian city of Kazan, often regarded as the country’s “third capital” after Moscow and St. Petersburg. Although several of the major tension points within the bloc, such as the Russo-Ukrainian War, may evolve significantly over the course of the coming year, Canada will likely still be faced with a global order that remains in flux as China, along with Russia, seeks to expand their economic and security ties across Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Pacific Island nations, and India continues to carefully manage its relationships with both Ottawa and Beijing.

REFERENCES

1. The World Bank. “Ethiopia Overview.” The World Bank, July 28, 2023. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview.
2. Eltahir, Nafisa. “Egypt’s Economy Seen Growing Steadily Over Next Three Years.” Reuters, July 21, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypts-economy-seen-growing-steadily-over-next-three-years-2022-07-21/.
3. El-Saharty, Sameh, Heba Nassar, Mariam M. Hamza, and Yi Zhang. “The Economic Impact of Population Growth in Egypt.” The World Bank, October 2022. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/1b624e67-a567-41ad-a616-af7a81117146/content.
4. Genet, Agumassie. “Population Growth and Land Use Land Cover Change Scenario in Ethiopia.” International Journal of Environmental Policy and Protection 8, no. 4 (2020): 77–78.
5. Springborg, Robert, and F.C. Williams. “The Egyptian Military: A Slumbering Giant Awakes.” Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, February 28, 2019. https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/02/28/egyptian-military-slumbering-giant-awakes-pub-78238.
6. Sigatu, Kaleab Tadesse. “Military Power as Foreign Policy Instrument: Post-1991 Ethiopian Peace Support Operations in the Horn of Africa.” Dissertation, Hungarian National University of Public Service, 2021, 77-79.
7. Chala, Teshome. “Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy in the New World Order System: Foreign Policy Direction and Its Determinants.” International Relations and Diplomacy 8, no. 10 (October 2020): 428–35.
8. Hawthorne, Emily. “After a Challenging Decade, Egypt Resumes Its Regional Role.” Stratfor, February 7, 2019. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/after-challenging-decade-egypt-resumes-its-regional-role.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chala, Teshome. “Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy in the New World Order System: Foreign Policy Direction and Its Determinants.” International Relations and Diplomacy 8, no. 10 (October 2020): 426–37.

El-Saharty, Sameh, Heba Nassar, Mariam M. Hamza, and Yi Zhang. “The Economic Impact of Population Growth in Egypt.” The World Bank, October 2022. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/1b624e67-a567-41ad-a616-af7a81117146/content.

Eltahir, Nafisa. “Egypt’s Economy Seen Growing Steadily Over Next Three Years.” Reuters, July 21, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypts-economy-seen-growing-steadily-over-next-three-years-2022-07-21/.

Genet, Agumassie. “Population Growth and Land Use Land Cover Change Scenario in Ethiopia.” International Journal of Environmental Policy and Protection 8, no. 4 (2020): 77–85.

Hawthorne, Emily. “After a Challenging Decade, Egypt Resumes Its Regional Role.” Stratfor, February 7, 2019. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/after-challenging-decade-egypt-resumes-its-regional-role.

Sigatu, Kaleab Tadesse. “Military Power as Foreign Policy Instrument: Post-1991 Ethiopian Peace Support Operations in the Horn of Africa.” Dissertation, Hungarian National University of Public Service, 2021.

Springborg, Robert, and F.C. Williams. “The Egyptian Military: A Slumbering Giant Awakes.” Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, February 28, 2019. https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/02/28/egyptian-military-slumbering-giant-awakes-pub-78238.

The World Bank. “Ethiopia Overview.” The World Bank, July 28, 2023. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview.