Canada-Japan Military Relations: Shaky Past, Uncertain Future?

As serving officer in the Royal Canadian Navy, I am currently employed in the Embassy of Canada as the Canadian Defence Attaché to Japan. In this role since 2018, I have had the privilege to occupy a front-row view of the rapidly evolving dynamic of peace and security cooperation between our two countries in recent years.

So what’s behind my less than inspiring title for this presentation – Canada-Japan Military Relations: Shaky Past, Uncertain Future, followed by a rather ominous question mark. Well, for those who have read my earlier article included in your reading list (http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/PDFs/CMJ221Ep23.pdf), you will recall that I divided the history of military relations between our two countries in three phases – from that of reluctant allies brought together by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, to that of distant enemies who drifted apart during the 1920s and 30s and eventually went to war in 1941, to that of partners with common interests. The latter phase started soon after the demise of the Japanese empire in 1945, built up into the Cold War and continues to evolve today.  

Perhaps the one common thread that persisted through these successive and contrasting periods is the episodic nature of the relationship. As allies, our military forces crossed path on some occasions during the First World War and during the Siberian Intervention but they never acted in a truly coordinated manner. Canada quickly and decidedly declared war on Japan in the evening of December 7^th 1941, on the very day of the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor. And yet Canadian forces only played a minor role in the Pacific as our focus remained squarely aimed at Europe and it is only in the winter of 1944-45 that dedicated planning started in Ottawa to mount a large expeditionary force for dispatch to the Pacific after Germany’s defeat. And then that contingency was swept away by the atomic bombs and the surrender of Japan in August 1945. And the end to the conflict was promptly followed by a polite refusal on the part of Ottawa to join the allied force being dispatched to occupy the Japanese islands, as the Canadian government was already focussed by that stage on the immediate demobilization of its armed forces.   

The episodic nature of the military relationship continued from the dawn of the Cold War to well past the fall of the Berlin Wall, even though both countries were solidly anchored in the anti-Soviet camp. Admittedly, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) maintained their focus on the defense of North America and the larger North Atlantic/Western European theatre through those years for valid reasons. The defence of Canada has always been and will always remain the most important task assigned to the CAF. And, if not going all the way back to the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement, at least since the 1958 establishment of NORAD (first known as the North American Air Defense Command and now the North American Aerospace Defense Command), the bilateral commitment with the United States to continental defence is another mission that has not and will not go away. And of course, our military commitment to NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) very much drove CAF commitments overseas during those decades.

By and large, all this made much sense under the tenets of the Cold War. The primary threat to Canada were Soviet bombers and missiles bringing nuclear Armageddon across the North Pole and the main conventional threat to our allies was that of the Red Army marching across the Iron Curtain to conquer the whole of Western Europe.

Meanwhile, if the hostilities broke out, Canada’s Pacific back door would be covered by the US Navy, which would turn the Pacific into an American lake by sweeping away the Soviet fleet and smashing the ground and air forces based in the Far East of the USSR. And behind this American spear would lay the shield formed by the three arms of the Japan Self-Defense Forces – the JSDF being composed the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) – all three services formed to defend the Japanese islands and the US bases hosted on Japanese soil.

The time allocated for my discussion does not allow me to go there in details but one must admit that not all was well with the Cold War JSDF, developed as they were under the pacifist constitution of 1947 while bearing an imperial legacy that weighed heavily on them, often impeding the formulation of a cogent and evolved military strategy. Indeed, each arm of the JSDF developed an advanced level of interoperability with their American sister service under the aegis of the Japan-US Alliance. This very close relationship between sister services perhaps verged on the unhealthy, leading Professor Garren Mulloy to conclude in his book Defenders of Japan that “… the services essentially planned three different Cold War scenarios with only the slightest reference between them.”

Ironically, there was some parallel there with the Cold War Canadian Forces, which were also quite siloed, more interested in working with their allied services than jointly together. The army prepared to fight a conventional war on the plains of Europe at the side of the NATO armies, the navy was all set to replay the Battle of the Atlantic in coordination with the US and British fleets, while the air force would take on the Soviet Bear bombers flying across the Canadian Artic within the bilateral construct of NORAD. And yet there the similarities between the CAF and the JSDF stopped as our Cold War relationship remained very much episodic in its nature. Our respective forces would bump into each other on occasional multinational exercises, most often those hosted by the United States such as the biannual maritime exercise RIMPAC in Hawaii, and our ships would conduct port visits in each other’s country, usually on the way to somewhere else rather than as an actual bilateral commitment. Nevertheless, it must also be acknowledged that each such opportunity for interaction between the CAF and the JSDF were highly valued on the Canadian side as we were always very impressed by the tactical acumen and professional excellence displayed by our Japanese counterparts as well as the quality of their equipment.

The end of the Cold War could have constituted an opportunity for a rapprochement between our forces. In Canada, the 1994 White Paper on Defence (https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D3-6-1994-eng.pdf) was one of many government policy documents that underlined at that pivotal juncture the importance of the Asia-Pacific to Canada’s future prosperity and security. At the same time, the JSDF made their first steps on the international scene with the deployment of a naval minesweeping force to the Persian Gulf in the wake of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and a first involvement in a UN peacekeeping mission, deploying to Cambodia in 1992. This just as Canadian forces were also operating in those same areas at the time. And yet unforeseen and repeated crisis in the Balkans and Africa kept the CAF focus away from the Pacific and Asia throughout the 1990s... And then Afghanistan nearly consumed all Canadian military efforts throughout the decade that followed the dramatic events of 9/11.   

Nevertheless, even as the CAF were still heavily invested in a violent counterinsurgency campaign in Kandahar Province, the government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper made a new approach to Japan in 2010, which was welcome by then Prime Minister Kan Naoto. The two leaders released an unprecedented Joint Declaration on Political, Peace and Security Cooperation (https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2010/11/2010-canada-japan-joint-declaration-political-peace-security-cooperation.html). This important statement gave rise to a flurry of activities, starting with the first ever Canada-Japan Political, Peace and Security Subcabinet Dialogue in 2011. This initiative was meant to launch regular meetings between the Japanese vice ministers and Canadian deputy ministers for foreign affairs and defence – hence the reference to 2+2 meetings. This was a serious signal of the growing importance placed by both countries on the bilateral relationship. The question for Canada, though, was whether this was just another episodic pivot to the Pacific, reflective of a shaky tradition between the two countries, or indeed an unprecedented moment laying a long-enduring foundation for an effective and credible commitment by Ottawa to the relationship with Japan.

Admittedly, the outbreak of the COVID pandemic in early 2020 did interrupt many in-person activities between our forces, such as staff talks and the attendance of officers on each others’ professional courses. And yet virtual means were quickly put to use to remedy this challenge as political figures and military leaders at the strategic level strove to maintain close and personal relations across the Pacific. At the tactical level, following a short pause in Spring 2020 to assess the impact of the pandemic on the conduct of operations overseas, the dispatch of Canadian ships and aircraft to Northeast Asia resumed in the fall. An important priority was indeed to continue making an active and effective contribution to the surveillance mission in support of United Nations sanctions against North Korea’s missile and nuclear programmes. This contribution is known as Operation Neon in Canada and takes place within the framework of a multinational mission to which Canada and Japan, among others, have been contributing ever since it was stood up in 2018 (https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-neon.html). This effort continues today with three Canadian officers working on the staff of the Enforcement Coordination Cell, the international headquarters hosted in Yokosuka which coordinates the employment of various assets provided by contributing nations to patrol waters in the region, including Canadian frigates and CP-140 maritime patrol aircraft.    

Investment in the relationship also continued at higher levels. In May 2021, then-foreign ministers Marc Garneau and Motegi Toshimitsu jointly announced Six Shared Priorities contributing to a free and open Indo-Pacific, six priorities that Canada and Japan would pursue together (https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2021/05/shared-canada-japan-priorities-contributing-to-a-free-and-open-indopacific-region.html). These are the rule of law, security, global health, energy, trade and climate change – most of those including some form of a defense and/or security dimension. Newly appointed Minister of National Defence Anita Anand and Minister of Defence Kishi Nobuo held a virtual introductory call in early December while Prime Ministers Justin Trudeau and Kishida Fumio have already interacted on several occasions, including in-person engagements during the COP26 meeting in Great Britain in November 2021 and on the margins of the G7 meeting in Brussels in March 2022. CAF planners are also hard at work this spring, elaborating plans for follow-on ships and aircraft deployments to Japan later this year. Again the focus of operations will be the UN sanctions surveillance mission and the opportunity to conduct exercises with the forces of like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, including the JSDF of course.

And yet… I am aware that doubts remain in the minds of many observers as to the Canadian long-term commitment to making a credible, effective and enduring contribution to peace and security in the Indo-Pacific in general, as well as to enlarging the bilateral defence and security relationship with Japan. Many a time academics and other analysts – be they Canadian, Japanese or from other like-minded nations – expressed a sincere concern that the flurry of activities in 2018-19 might just have been another short-lived burst of hyperactive commitment that will be followed by another trough in the years ahead, reflective of our long tradition of episodic engagements.

And, most recently, the Australian and Japanese prime ministers signed an unprecedented Reciprocal Access Agreement (the RAA). This is the first status of forces agreement the Government of Japan has signed with any country other than the United States, with the important difference of being reciprocal, unlike the US-Japan SOFA. This agreement will facilitate deployments, joint exercises and operations, and the basing of forces between the two countries by establishing procedures for a mutual approach in facilitating the entry of troops into each country and their access to local military facilities, mundane issues such as the administration of taxes and import duties, and more fundamental concepts such as legal status of one’s troops when deployed in the other country.

So, while none of these agreements formally commit a signatory to the other’s defence, this trifecta of technical arrangements can make a huge difference in facilitating greater inter-operability and mutual support between military forces deployed on operations. Several of Japan’s like-minded partners have signed ACSAs and ISAs with Tokyo in recent years, while Great Britain and France have already indicated an interest in pursuing the Australian precedent set with the RAA. Canada concluded the ACSA with Japan in 2018 (http://www.ilajapan.org/jyil/components/treaties/2019/1-7_Canada.pdf). ISA and, in the longer-term, RAA, may both warrant consideration by Canadian and Japanese authorities if they wish to elevate the military relationship to the next level.

Also key to interoperability between two foreign militaries is developing greater mutual understanding between the two forces – bet it in terms doctrine, concepts and tactics, familiarisation with each other equipment and weapons, as well as a comprehension of each other’s culture, society and traditions. This level of mutual understanding can only be achieved through the development and sustainment of long-lasting personal relationships at the individual level. The CAF has a long tradition of sending, and hosting, numerous exchange and liaison officers with the forces of allied and partner countries as well as swapping officers on career course and professional development venues. Such exchanges have begun between the CAF and the JSDF but score more possibilities could be explored between the services, especially once the pandemic is resolved and person-to-person exchanges can be resumed more fully.

As mentioned previously, CAF and JSDF units and personnel already have a mature tradition of training together on a variety of bilateral and multinational exercises. Of all the services, the two navies have cumulated the deepest level of cooperation when deployed on bilateral exercises off our respective coasts, taking part in very challenging Japan-US maritime exercises here in Northeast Asia, as well as even more advanced multinational exercises, from RIMPAC off Hawaii to Talisman Saber off Australia. A logical next step would be to deploy and operate together to achieve mutual objectives as laid out in our respective foreign policies. A combined naval force made up of ships and aircraft from two countries deploying together to navigate through contested waters make for a potent message of political will when confronting disruptors of the rules-based order. As importantly, and in a much less confrontational manner, strategic messaging of support can be most effective when such a combined force joins the navy of a local like-minded partner to conduct exercises at sea and/or combined visits to a local base where both partners can engage in capacity-building activities, the usual round of defence diplomacy engagements, etc.

Which, in turn, leads to the fourth type of activity that may warrant consideration, that of forward-deploying military assets to maintain a permanent presence in the Indo-Pacific. Forward-deployment refers to the capacity to maintain forces in a given region on a permanent basis, or at least for an extended period of time. Canada’s current approach is to deploy ships and aircraft regularly in order to maintain a repeated, persistent presence in the Indo-Pacific but forward-deployment seeks to make this presence nearly permanent by rotating ships/aircraft/crews so as to always have some assets in the region. A recent example was the announcement last year that Great Britain would deploy two patrol vessels to the Indo-Pacific for a period of five years. The two ships will not be attached to any particular base in the region but will rove from the eastern shores of Africa to the west coast of the United States with crews rotating in and out at appropriate intervals. Such presence is another form of effective strategic messaging and vessels like this could take on some of the joint operations with local partners that I referred to earlier.

Indeed, all four dimensions of such activities could play a role in advancing an agenda whereby Canada and Japan seek to promote greater peace and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. All four could contribute to greater inter-operability between Canadian and Japanese forces, all four could support and promote national objectives and policies of mutual interest to Ottawa and Tokyo, all four could fit within a framework of larger measures that go beyond purely military means in order to sustain and protect the rules-based order into the 21^st century. Admittedly, most of these means have costs attached to them – other than perhaps the pursuit of agreements such as the ISA and RAA. But undertaking additional exchanges of personnel, deploying on joint operations, and forward-deploying forces permanently have heavy costs attached them in terms of personnel, equipment maintenance and availability of assets for other national tasks. These costs are especially heavy for the CAF, which are already strained in terms of personnel and equipment resources, while facing as they do increasing commitments at home, in North America, as part of NATO in Europe, and elsewhere around the globe as Canada continues to play an active and committed role on the international scene.

So, I have to admit that is quite easy for me to put those ambitious options forward from my lonely pulpit here at the Embassy. But I must leave the hard work to you to ponder over those considerations during your group discussions in the days ahead. I wish you good luck as you try to determine what is in the realm of the possible, and affordable, if we wish to take Canada-Japan military relations beyond their shaky past and uncertain future in support of greater peace and security cooperation in the Asia/Indo-Pacific.