TOP SECRET

**ORDER**

of the People’s Commissar of State Security of the USSR for 1946

**№ 008. Contents:** Announcement of the “Instructions on the Work of the Political Monitoring (“PK”) Agencies of the NKGB.”

**№ 008** 8 January 1946 Moscow

Hereby announced, for the purposes of guidance, are the “Instructions on the Work of the Political Monitoring (“PK”) Agencies of the NKGB.”

All previously issued orders, instructions, circulars, and directives on the work of the “PK” agencies are hereby rescinded.

The censorship of **military** correspondence should be guided by current orders, circulars, and directives on the work of the military censorship agencies of the NKGB of the USSR.

“P” measures are to be carried out in accordance with NKGB circular № 60 of 12 May 1944.

To be distributed to relevant parties.

People’s Commissar of State Security of the USSR

Army General **V. MERKULOV**

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**TOP SECRET**

**On the same basis as encrypted**

“APPROVED”

People’s Commissar of State Security of the USSR

Army General **V. Merkulov**

31 December 1945.

**“INSTRUCTIONS ON THE WORK OF THE POLITICAL MONITORING (“PK”) AGENCIES OF THE NKGB.”**

**I. “PK” Aims and Tasks**

1. The covert monitoring of the population’s postal and telegraphic correspondence “PK” is carried out for the purpose of:

a) disclosing the nature of correspondence and connections of persons under the intelligence surveillance of the NKVD, NKGB, the “Smersh” Counterintelligence Unit of the NKO, and the “Smersh” Counterintelligence Unit of the NKVMF;

b) detecting potential anti-Soviet, espionage-related, provocative, and other criminal and politically harmful correspondence, both overt and covert (encrypted, encoded, etc.);

c) preventing the dissemination of anti-Soviet documents (leaflets, proclamations, anonymous letters, etc.) and anti-Soviet literature in all its forms;

d) preventing the disclosure of military and state secrets in postal correspondence;

e) preventing any other possible use of postal and telegraphic correspondence to the detriment of the state interests of the Soviet Union;

f) gauging political sentiment and the reactions of various strata of the population to domestic and foreign political events.

2. “PK” agencies are charged with:

a) screening postal and telegraphic correspondence as directed by the NKGB, NKVD, the “Smersh” Counterintelligence Unit of the NKO, and the “Smersh” Counterintelligence Unit of the NKVMF;

b) the covert surveillance of all incoming and outgoing international postal and telegraphic correspondence;

c) the selective covert surveillance of domestic postal correspondence;

2

[page break]

d) identifying authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents by their handwriting;

e) using postal and telegraphic communications to carry out various operational assignments of the state security agencies (arranging for personnel to hand-deliver documents; delivering correspondence; removing the contents of mailboxes; dispatching documents, etc.);

f) keeping a card file on all persons engaged in written communication with foreign countries;

g) informing the relevant authorities as to topics of interest revealed in the course of the covert inspection of postal correspondence.

3. “PK” sites are **forbidden** to engage in the covert inspection of mail in transit through the USSR to other countries, as well as the postal and telegraphic correspondence of embassies, consulates, and foreign correspondents, both domestic and international.

**II. The Structure of “PK” Agencies and Their Location**

4. The monitoring of all international and domestic postal and telegraphic correspondence shall be entrusted exclusively to “V” departments (divisions) of the NKGB-UNKGB and their peripheral sites, in accordance with the locations authorized for same.

5. New “PK” sites are to be established only with the authorization of the People’s Commissar of State Security of the USSR or his deputies.

6. The “V” Department of the NKGB of the USSR is to carry out operational oversight, and inspect and monitor the work of all peripheral “PK” agencies.

7. “PK” sites located in republic-level, territorial, and regional centers are headed by “PK” site (division) directors, and report directly to directors of “V” departments (divisions) of the NKGB-UNKGB.

Municipal and district “PK” sites are headed by “PK” site directors detailed from among operatives, and report directly to directors of municipal and district departments (divisions) of the NKGB.

Management of the work of all “PK” sites is entrusted to directors of the corresponding territorial “V” departments (divisions) of the NKGB-UNKGB.

8. “PK” sites are divided into three categories:

a) Category 1 is to carry out all manner of monitoring of postal and telegraphic correspondence, both domestic and international;

3

[page break]

b) Category 2 is to carry out all manner of monitoring of **postal** correspondence, except for the monitoring of international correspondence;

c) Category 3 is solely to perform the screening of **postal** correspondence in accordance with operational assignments.

9. Category 1 includes the “PK” sites located in the following cities: Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv, Odessa, Uzhgorod, Lviv, Minsk, Riga, Kaunas, Tallinn, Tbilisi, Baku, Yerevan, Ashgabat, Tashkent, Alma-Ata, Kishinev, Ulan-Ude, Chita, Vladivostok, Murmansk, and Arkhangelsk.

Category 2 includes all other “PK” sites in republic-level, territorial, regional, and major municipal and district centers.

Category 3 includes “PK” sites staffed by no more than three persons.

N o t e s: a) New sites for the monitoring of international correspondence may only be organized with the authorization of the People’s Commissar of State Security of the USSR or his deputies;

b) Category 2 “PK” sites may only monitor the international correspondence of persons under intelligence investigation as directed by agencies of state security;

c) Category 3 sites are **forbidden** to engage in any monitoring of international correspondence, with the exception of screening it;

d) Category 3 sites may perform selective readings of domestic correspondence only in cases of particular importance, and only as directed by operational departments as authorized by people’s commissars of state security, directors of the UNKGB, or their deputies.

In such cases, directors of “V” departments (divisions) may temporarily increase “PK” site staffing by detailing personnel from other sites.

10. In selecting locations for “PK” sites, the following guidance must be adhered to:

a) “PK” sites should be located according to correspondence routes, typically in places where sorting hubs are located, into which correspondence from several districts flows;

b) First and foremost, it must be possible to selectively check correspondence from major industrial centers, districts where defense enterprises and railway hubs are located, border districts, fortified districts, territory that has been under occupation, etc.;

4

[page break]

c) It is essential to monitor the correspondence of special contingents of the population (with particular attention paid to districts where colonists, administrative deportees, special settlers, etc. reside).

11. In submitting “PK” site locations for the approval of the NKGB of the USSR, explanatory memoranda must be drawn up, giving a brief political and economic description of the district to be served by the site, with an appended chart showing the flow of correspondence in communications facilities.

12. The location of “PK” sites shall be strictly classified, and no summary information as to their locations is to be provided to communications agencies.

13. In accordance with the scope of their work in monitoring postal and telegraphic correspondence, category 1 “PK” sites shall be divided into groups according to their particular work processes:

a) a document screening group;

b) a group for unsealing and resealing documents;

c) a group for monitoring domestic correspondence;

d) a group for monitoring international correspondence;

e) a chemical monitoring group.

Each group is to be headed by an operative specially detailed for this purpose.

Category 2 “PK” sites are not to have groups established for particular types of work; rather, permanent staff members are assigned to each work process (screening, unsealing, resealing, reading, etc.).

N o t e: In “PK” sites that are subdivided into groups, correspondence is to be transferred for further processing from one group to another with accompanying certificates indicating the following: the date and time of the documents’ processing; their quantity; and the reference number of the staff member who performed the work.

**III. Operational Secrecy**

14. Postal and telegraphic monitoring is only to be carried out under conditions by which its secrecy is ensured. The main requirement for “PK” sites’ proper organization is adherence to **the strictest operational secrecy, not only as to methods of the work, but also the very fact of the existence of the covert inspection of postal and telegraphic correspondence**.

The operational secrecy of “PK” work can be achieved first and foremost by carefully concealing the premises where “PK” sites are located, skillfully disguising the delivery of correspondence to “PK” sites, and seeing to the operational secrecy of “PK” staff members.

5

[page break]

“PK” sites may only begin operations with the authorization of people’s commissars of state security or directors of the UNKGB, who must first personally (or via their deputies) verify the existence of conditions necessary for operational secrecy at each particular site.

15. The operational secrecy of official “PK” personnel and their administrative, economic, financial, and material support staff shall be organized according to the principles adopted for clandestine personnel of NKGB agencies.

“PK” staff members working onsite are forbidden to wear uniforms.

The primary cover of “PK” personnel is that they are employees of postal agencies. The nature of worksite certification is to be determined by people’s commissars of union and autonomous republics and territorial and regional directors of the UNKGB, depending on the requirements of operational secrecy under local conditions.

16. Every possible measure should be taken to avoid staff turnover and to retain “PK” personnel for extended periods of time.

17. “PK” personnel whose cover has been compromised are to be transferred to work at other sites or in other departments.

18. “PK” sites are to be located in isolated premises at post offices and postal and telegraph bureaus and branches. These premises are to be kept secret from unauthorized persons and employees of communications enterprises (those not involved in the “PK” sites’ activities), under the guise of classified, financial, and other such dispatch departments at major post offices, and at smaller bureaus and branches, in accordance with local conditions. The “PK” premises should be equipped accordingly, with attention paid to the isolation of entry points, soundproofing, and covering the premises with curtains, drapery, etc.

“PK” sites must be staffed on a twenty-four-hour basis.

19. The delivery of correspondence to “PK” sites and the return of processed correspondence from them is to be organized according to local conditions, in such a way as to eliminate the possibility of this process being uncovered, and to reduce the number of postal employees involved to the strictly necessary minimum.

20. All postal employees involved in the delivery of correspondence to “PK” sites and the dispatch of correspondence therefrom are to be specially vetted and bound by the nondisclosure pledge.

Postal workers who are employed at “PK”-affiliated premises but who cannot be engaged in assisting with the work due to their political unreliability must, in consultation with trans-

6

[page break]

portation authorities, be dismissed under plausible pretexts and replaced by suitable personnel.

21. Issues arising in the course of interaction with communications agencies are to be resolved as follows:

а) Fundamental issues of all-union significance shall be resolved by the NKGB USSR’s “V” Department at the People’s Commissariat of Communications of the USSR;

b) Issues of republic-level, territorial, and regional significance shall be resolved by republic-level commissars of state security, directors of the UNKGB, or as entrusted by them, directors of “V” departments (divisions) of the NKGB-UNKGB, along with local investigation officers of the NKS;

c) At the district level, communication with directors of district postal agencies, bureaus, and branches (who are to be specially vetted and bound by the nondisclosure pledge) is to be maintained by senior officials of “PK” sites, and, if necessary, by directors of municipal and district departments (divisions) of the NKGB.

22. In the event that the cover of a “PK” site is compromised, then, along with investigating the reasons for this compromise and identifying the guilty parties, it is essential that the “PK” site be completely shut down and relocated to other premises or to another district.

Such cases should be treated as an emergency situation and immediately reported to the “V” Division of the NKGB of the USSR.

**IV. Basic Rules of “PK” Operations**

**А. Screening of Correspondence**

23. “PK” sites shall have designated screeners or screening groups, who are to be charged with:

a) screening documents, per assignments;

b) screening documents not subject to perlustration (addressed to members of governments; diplomatic, transit, and international documents);

c) detecting and detaining documents suspected of having anti-Soviet content;

d) identifying authors of anonymous anti-Soviet letters by comparing documents with handwriting samples from previously detained anonymous letters.

The approximate inspection rate for screeners is to be 8,000–10,000 documents per working day per employee.

7

[page break]

24. Only the best, most proven, and longest-term employees of NKGB agencies are to be made screeners.

The work of screeners (or groups thereof) is to be directly supervised by directors of “V” departments (divisions) or of “PK” sites.

Employees of all other categories are forbidden to interfere in screening work.

25. Screening shall be carried out in isolated premises or locations, access to which is forbidden to persons not directly involved in screening, including operational staff.

26. The screening of postal correspondence of persons monitored by NKGB agencies is to be implemented solely under assignments approved by heads of NKGB USSR directorates, republic-level commissars of state security, heads of territorial and regional directorates of the NKGB, directors of municipal and district departments (divisions) of the NKGB, and directors of transport and water departments of the NKGB, or their deputies. Assignments from the NKVD, the “Smersh” Counterintelligence Unit of the NKO, and the “Smersh” Counterintelligence Unit of the NKVMF, are to be accepted with the authorization of the relevant republic-level people’s commissars of state security, directors of the UNKGB, and directors of territorially corresponding municipal and district departments (divisions) of the NKGB.

27. Correspondence screening assignments should specify the types of correspondence to be screened: domestic, international, letters, telegrams, packages, parcels, etc.

The task of screening telegrams, packages, and parcels may be assigned only in exceptional cases of particular need.

28. By order of the People’s Commissar of State Security (head of the UNKGB), a certain norm of assignments should be established for each directorate (department), in the amount of no more than 200–300 addressees for each screener.

29. “PK” sites are to receive correspondence screening assignments only through “V” departments (divisions) of the NKGB-UNKGB, and at the district level, directly from heads of municipal and district departments (divisions) of the NKGB. Assignments are to be handwritten and personally delivered to directors of “V” departments (divisions), and at the district level, to senior officials of “PK” sites, without being registered in regular recordkeeping.

30. All operational departments are to detail employees of no lower a position than deputy investigation officer to maintain communication with “V” departments (divisions), receive documents from them, return inspected documents to them, see to the timely assignment and completion of “PK” tasks, etc.

31. Screening assignments are valid for 3 months, after which they must be withdrawn unless extended by additional

8

[page break]

notification from the relevant operational department.

Lists of active assignments should be checked monthly to remove persons whose surveillance has been terminated.

Directors of operational departments are required to notify “PK” sites of the termination of an assignment in a timely manner, so as to avoid backlogs and unnecessary delays in mail delivery.

32. Correspondence screening assignments are to be personally registered in a special log by directors of “V” departments (divisions) or directors of “PK” sites and handed over for implementation to senior screeners, who are to sign acknowledgement of their receipt.

33. ScreeningS tasks are to be entered in special lists in alphabetical order and kept top secret; access to them is to be permitted only to persons directly involved in screening.

Upon completion of the work, these lists are to be securely stored or covered by special shields and sealed.

34. Assignments that have been carried out and lists thereof are to be personally destroyed by directors of “V” departments (divisions) or by directors of municipal and district departments (divisions) of the NKGB, respectively, pursuant to reports approved by commissars of state security (UNKGB directors).

35. “PK” site directors and senior officials of screening groups are to monitor the work of screeners by selectively reinspecting correspondence that has undergone screening.

Site directors (senior officials) are obliged to check no fewer than 500 letters daily, and senior officials of screening groups, no fewer than 1,000 letters.

36. Letters screened for operational departments are to be unsealed, checked as to enclosed contents, and entered in an inventory, to include the name of each addressee and the order number (if the letter is registered). If there are any contents enclosed other than the letter, a special notation is to be made.

Letters returned from departments are to be checked as to both their quantity and enclosed contents, so as to verify the integrity and correctness of the latter.

Letters must be returned in proper condition, without any trace of the work performed on them, and should be enclosed in envelopes as the sender had done (**attention should be paid to all details**).

37. Whether a letter screened as assigned is to be confiscated or permitted to proceed to its address shall be determined on the basis of notations of operational departments made in accompanying inventories.

The right of confiscation shall be exercised by directors of operational departments and their deputies.

9

[page break]

38. The delay time for correspondence screened for other departments and for processing at “PK” sites is not to exceed a total of 6 hours. In particular cases, regular and registered letters may be delayed up to 24 hours, and express and air mail—up to the time of the next regular dispatch (delivery).

39. In instances in which they are located far from the agencies that have tasked them with screening, “PK” sites are not to transfer the selected letters, but, in coordination with the relevant departments, should inspect them on site and, depending on the contents, send copies of letters or memoranda (extracts) to departments.

40. In particular cases, with the authorization of people’s commissars of state security of union and autonomous republics and territorial and regional directors of the UNKGB, in places where it is not possible to organize a “PK” site, it is permitted to recruit postal workers as mail screeners, as assigned by operational departments.

**B. The Identification of Authors of Anonymous Anti-Soviet Letters and Leaflets**

41. One of the keys tasks of the “PK” sites is to detect and seize anti-Soviet leaflets and anonymous letters and to use their handwriting to find their authors.

42. To this end, screeners are to screen and detain for examination all letters that may be suspected of having anti-Soviet content. Such correspondence includes letters with addresses in obviously distorted handwriting; letters that are typewritten or mimeographed; letters sent to several addresses by the same person; letters addressed to institutions without a return address; letters with thin tissue paper enclosed (detected by touch); overly bulky packages; etc.

43. When searching for the authors of anonymous anti-Soviet letters by screening correspondence based on handwriting samples of previously detained documents, it is necessary to be guided by the following:

a) the selection of documents by handwriting comparison should typically be organized in coordination with the investigative units of the second directorates (departments), with monitoring based on handwriting samples recommended by the latter;

b) from available handwriting samples of anonymous anti-Soviet letters, the handwritings selected for the investigation should be the most authentic ones, since selection based on distorted handwriting, standard print fonts, etc. will be ineffective;

c) the screener should be given a small number of samples, so as to focus his attention on what is most important and to achieve the desired result;

10

[page break]

d) the screener should study and memorize the handwriting samples submitted for monitoring;

e) the task of identifying authors of especially important documents should also be entrusted to readers, who are to be given handwriting samples for comparison purposes in inspecting letters.

In these cases, readers should also study the particular stylistic features of the anonymous letter, bearing in mind that identical content, the manner of phrasing, etc., can also help identify the anonymous author;

f) In cases in which the same leaflets and anonymous letters appear repeatedly in a particular district, it is necessary to conduct an all-around inspection of the correspondence of this district for investigative purposes.

**C. The Performance of Other Operational Tasks**

44. “PK” sites are to be entrusted with carrying out various operational measures vis-à-vis postal and telegraphic communications as assigned by state security agencies: arranging for personnel to hand-deliver documents; delivering correspondence; removing the contents of mailboxes; the postal registration and dispatch of documents; etc.

45. Each such measure should be carefully thought out and executed according to a plan agreed upon with the requisite operational department.

46. Postal workers recruited to take part in these particular operations must be specially selected and vetted.

**D. Reading Correspondence**

47. The monitoring of domestic correspondence should take into account the need to selectively read those types of correspondence that are of the greatest operational interest in terms of protecting state security at the given time and in relation to local conditions.

Particular attention should be paid to the inspection of correspondence coming from districts where key industrial and defense enterprises and facilities are located, districts where special contingents are settled, etc.

Also to be inspected more frequently are letters coming from border districts and addressed to such districts, correspondence of the population of territories that had been under German occupation, post restante letters, letters without return addresses, letters executed in well-developed handwriting, etc.

48. In order to organize the systematic screening of correspondence for selective inspection, “V” departments and branches of the NKGB-

11

[page break]

UNKGB are to prepare quarterly calendar plans for the reading of domestic correspondence, guided in this by instructions of the center and assignments of operational departments. The plans should indicate: the target task of the inspection; the volume of correspondence; the population contingent whose correspondence is to be inspected; the inspection sites; and the period during which certain types of correspondence are to be inspected in a given district, region, territory, or republic.

49. In determining the volume of correspondence subject to selective reading, the rate of 400–500 letters per monitor per working day should be used. This rate should be regarded as a reference point, not something to be hurriedly overfulfilled.

The emphasis should be on the quality of the inspection, both in terms of the thoroughness of the inspection technique and the identification of material of operational interest.

50. One of the key conditions for maintaining the secrecy of the covert inspection of correspondence is that readers follow the rules for handling documents.

The most important of these rules are as follows:

a) monitors are obliged to ensure that, after inspection, the letter is inserted back in the envelope as it was previously. In doing so, attention should be paid to possible prearranged signs and practices deliberately followed by the sender.

When such prearranged signs and practices are detected, the monitor should report it to the director (senior official) of the site (group) and, if the document is permitted to proceed to its address, these prearranged signs and practices are to be kept as they were;

b) strict care must be taken not to mix up the correspondence of different addressees or to lose items enclosed in letters;

c) the monitor is not to begin inspecting the next letter until the previous one has been placed back into its envelope;

d) it is strictly forbidden to remove letters from envelopes “in midair,” which may result in the misplacement of enclosed items (usually snapshots or other small objects);

e) The monitor’s workplace is to be comfortable, and kept in order and tidy.

It must not be overcrowded or cramped. There should be no extraneous objects, and especially no documents, on the desk of the monitor;

f) care must be taken to ensure that no extraneous texts (especially the monitor’s notes) are placed on top of letters, as this may produce contact prints that can be read using quartz rays;

12

[page break]

g) the monitor is obliged to see to his personal hygiene, and especially to ensure that his hands are clean when working with documents.

51. Depending on their contents, all letters, parcels, and telegrams read and inspected at “PK” sites are either to be permitted to proceed to their address, or confiscated or sent to the appropriate NKGB (UNKGB) department for operational use.

52. During the reading process, in addition to checking content, the monitor is to inspect documents for the presence of secret writing, codes, ciphers, and other conventions.

Particular attention should be paid to the following characteristics:

a) ambiguities in the text (when the meaning of a phrase is unclear, or its construction is not characteristic of the given language);

b) any marks in the text of the letter (perforations, underlining, dots under letters or words);

c) unusual lettering, the incorrect placement of stamps, etc.;

d) excessively detailed descriptions of minor events (weather, etc.) that may serve as a code;

e) the possible presence of text under wax seals, postage stamps, stickers on letters, or on the interior side or under the decorative lining of envelopes;

f) writing containing a great quantity of numerals, graphs designating a patient’s temperature or meteorological observations, and the like;

g) all manner of drawings and pictures, which may contain prearranged signs and images;

h) thick postcards, which may turn out to be several pasted together;

i) text written on a typewriter as if having a faulty typeface, with certain letters misaligned (above or below the line);

j) variations in the spacing between words that might correspond to dots and dashes in Morse code;

l) strange arrangements of text, decipherable by superimposing a slit pattern on the letter. In some cases, this is clear from certain words being written in either an expanded or compressed form;

Letters of suspicious content or seeming to contain any prearranged signs and practices should be checked for secret writing, and stamps should be removed with steam. In these cases, it is recommended that all the flaps of the envelope be unglued as well.

53. Information obtained from the reading of correspondence is recorded in the form of memoranda. The memorandum is to include either a copy of the entire letter or an excerpt (without distorting the text)

13

[page break]

that is of operational or informational interest.

54. Materials of immediate interest for intelligence workup are to be transmitted for use to requisite departments in the form of special communiques, memoranda, or photocopies. The letters themselves may also be transmitted.

55. In cases in which “PK” materials cannot be immediately used for intelligence workup (due to unclarity; the letter’s addressee being unknown; contents that seem to contain prearranged signs and practices or signals but that may turn out to be incidental; etc.), these materials are to be used to open surveillance files for the further study of correspondence. The files are to be transferred to operational departments as relevant material is accumulated.

NOTE: The originals of anonymous anti-Soviet letters, proclamations, leaflets, etc., are to be handed over to operational departments immediately. Reprinting such materials in special reports and memos, or drawing up memoranda based on them, is prohibited.

56. “PK” materials of operational interest to police and criminal investigators are to be reported thereto through the NKVD-UNKVD in anonymized form, without indicating the source.

57. Operational departments that make workup and investigative use of “PK” materials are obliged to consider them as intelligence and informant materials, with all the consequent methods of their use.

58. In the correspondence of NKGB agencies, it is forbidden to mention the words “perlustration,” “letter,” “telegram,” “confiscate,” or “send to its address.” Instead of these, the following words are to be used, respectively: “PK,” “document,” “report,” “k,” and “a.”

59. Subject to confiscation are letters of the following content:

a) letters that contain anti-Soviet, provocative/slanderous, panic-mongering, espionage-related, and other messages directed against the state interests of the Soviet Union;

b) that contain various anti-Soviet documents and publications (leaflets, pamphlets, caricatures, etc.);

c) documents and publications of religious propaganda, except for officially permitted ones (permission to proceed to their address is to be coordinated with the relevant 2nd departments and directorates of the NKGB-UNKGB);

d) letters that contain messages divulging state and military secrets, warning about plans and actions of the Red Army, about operational activities of the NKVD, NKGB, the “Smersh” Counterintelligence Unit of the NKO, or the “Smersh” Counterintelligence Unit of the NKVMF; or that contain summary data on arrests, or hostile interpretation of particular arrests;

14

[page break]

NOTES: 1. Information constituting a military secret includes data on: mobilization plans and measures; the composition, size, and designation of units of the Red Army and the Navy; the location and movement of military units, squadrons, or military or naval vessels; the nature of work on the construction of fortified points, their armament, and garrison size; new forms of weaponry and classified inventions; the staffing of new troop formations; military transportation; the technical condition of railroads, highways, and waterways; the condition of telegraph and telephone lines; the location and power of radio stations; the progress of frontline combat, numbers of killed and wounded, results of bombardments, railway accidents, and planned and ongoing operations; the work of military and defense plants, numbers of workers, plant equipment and location, and the progress of the fulfillment of defense-related orders; the location of military facilities, warehouses, airfields, gas shelters, or fortified points; and epidemic illnesses in the army and the rear.

2. The “Listing of Information Not To Be Published in the Open Press,” issued by Glavlit USSR, should be used in determining what information constitutes a state secret.

3. Letters reporting arrests made by NKGB agencies may be permitted to continue to their address only per agreement with the relevant department.

e) pornographic documents, postcards, or photographs.

60. Internal correspondence with monetary enclosures, regardless of the amount, are to be permitted to continue to their “a” without hindrance.

The removal of valuables from letters that are to be sent to their address is prohibited.

If money, bonds, or other valuables are found to be enclosed in a letter, the monitor (screener) is to turn the letter over to the site (group) director, who shall register the detected valuables in a special log and be responsible for the further dispatch of the letter.

Money and valuables removed in the course of confiscating letters based on their content are to be turned over to the state as ownerless, through the financial departments of the NKGB-UNKGB. Confiscated valuables are to be registered in a special log. Receipts of the handover of valuables are kept as supporting documents in the files of “V” departments and divisions of the NKGB-UNKGB.

Directors of “V” departments and divisions of the NKGB-UNKGB are to perform monthly audits of records of confiscated valuables.

15

[page break]

61. International and domestic documents are to be confiscated only with the authorization of people’s commissars of state security of union and autonomous republics, territorial and regional directors of the UNKGB, and the director of the “V” Division of the NKGB of the USSR.

Confiscated documents not subject to operational use are to be destroyed (not earlier than one month from the moment of confiscation) pursuant to inventories approved by directors of “V” departments (divisions) of the NKGB-UNKGB.

Confiscated documents sent for operational use are to be destroyed, when necessary, pursuant to approved inventories by the operational departments themselves.

**E. Information Gained from “PK” Materials**

62. “V” departments and divisions of the NKGB-UNKGB are to routinely submit informational reports to the “V” Division of the NKGB of the USSR on “PK” materials of the most currently topical importance for the given republic (territory, region). For example: on the restoration of the economy in a territory liberated from occupation; on sowing and harvesting campaigns in leading agricultural areas; on the work of key enterprises; on political sentiment and statements made by the population regarding key domestic and foreign political events; etc.

63. Information should be organized such that it reflects signals about the situation in particular districts or a particular republic, territory, or region, as well as at some of the largest and most important enterprises.

In drawing up a calendar plan for the selective inspection of letters, it is necessary to outline the main topics of information gained from “PK” materials.

64. Attention must be paid to the careful selection of letter excerpts to be placed in special communiques, and their relevance and typicality to the issue covered. It is also essential that addressees and dates be accurately indicated. (If the letter is not dated, the date should be determined from the postmark of its origin point.)

65. “PK” materials of informational interest to local party and Soviet agencies are to be used by the NKGB-UNKGB to inform only first secretaries of regional committees of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and the material should be presented in anonymized form, without indicating the source.

66. Materials worthy of the attention of NKVD agencies (on gangs, criminal manifestations, public disturbances, etc.) are to be transferred to the relevant people’s commissariats

16

[page break]

of internal affairs and UNKVD directors for verification and requisite measures.

Using these materials to inform other agencies without requisite NKVD corroboration is not permitted.

67. Special communiques on letters of operational interest to the central organs of state security (reports of terrorist activity, counterrevolutionary formations, anti-Soviet manifestations, acts of treachery and treason, or sabotage or other enemy actions) are to be submitted to the NKGB of the USSR without delay.

68. Reports and communiques on “PK” materials must be signed by people’s commissars of state security, directors of the UNKGB, or their deputies.

**F. Checking for Secret Writing**

69. Checking documents for secret writing is to be carried out at specially equipped “PK” sites, located as established by the “V” Department of the NKGB of the USSR.

70. Documents to be checked for secret writing are those selected as assigned by operational departments, as well as those suspected by controller-readers of potentially containing secret writing (due to sparsely arranged lines, dashes under the text, blank sheets of paper and envelopes, semantic hints in the text, etc.).

71. Documents are to be checked for secret writing using methods that leave no visible trace.

If there is substantial cause to suspect the presence of secret writing, the document is to be subjected to individual chemical processing using techniques recommended by the “Instructions for the Detailed Examination of Correspondence for Secret Writing.”

Documents suspected of containing “TS” should also be examined in reflected light, so as to detect possible micro-photo miniatures, secretly embossed texts, etc.

72. In cases in which “V” departments and divisions encounter documents bearing signs of secret writing, but do not have the special equipment necessary to check for such writing, they may send them for processing to the “V” Department of the NKGB of the USSR, or to the nearest “V” Department of the NKGB-UNKGB in possession of the requisite equipment.

**V. The Technical Processing of Letters**

**A. Unsealing and Resealing**

73. The careful technical processing of letters is crucial to maintaining the cover of “PK” operations.

17

[page break]

74. In order to ensure the qualified processing of letters, “PK” sites are to organize groups for the unsealing and resealing of letters.

At smaller sites, individual monitors are to be assigned to these operations.

The unsealing and resealing of international documents, as well as documents selected (screened) per operational assignments, should be performed by the most qualified staff.

75. Unsealing groups are responsible for opening documents carefully, leaving no trace.

76. Documents received damaged, torn, or heavily soiled are to be returned to postal staff to be stamped (postal proviso) as damaged.

Such documents are to be opened only if they have been screened per assignment or are suspected of containing anti-Soviet materials.

77. Documents are to be unsealed exclusively using vapor machines. Documents that cannot be unsealed with steam because they contain letters written in chemical ink, or photographs, are to be unsealed using a bone folder.

Documents are to be unsealed over steam, with the sharp end of the bone folder on the most easily openable flap.

78. The staff member is to unseal a letter only after preliminarily inspecting it and determining whether it is possible to use steam to do so.

If the staff member attempting to unseal the letter has doubts as to whether it can be unsealed without damaging it, he must report this to the group’s (site’s) senior official and act as instructed.

79. After being opened, documents are to be placed such that unsealed flaps do not stick to each other.

80. If documents are damaged during unsealing, the staff member must personally report the damage to the senior official of the group (site).

Damage may be repaired only by means that can fully guarantee concealment.

Damaged and repaired documents may be sent to the address only with the authorization of the site director or senior official.

81. The target rate for staff members engaged in unsealing is to be 2,000–2,500 documents per qualified employee per working day.

82. Documents are to be resealed only after checking that they are properly enclosed and free of foreign objects.

Particular care should be taken to ensure that any traces left on the letter from when the sender first sealed it follow the envelope’s flap-edges exactly.

18

[page break]

When applying the flaps, the staff member must also ensure that the rims of postmarks and other stamps match exactly.

The target rate for employees engaged in resealing is to be 1,500–2,000 documents per qualified employee per working day.

83. It is recommended that starch glue be used to reseal documents. The glue should be applied with extreme caution, in a thin layer, so that no excess glue emerges. Some envelopes can be resealed using the glue left on the flaps. Gluing brushes must be of good quality and kept clean and in proper working order.

84. Documents are to be sent to their destination only after the correctness of their technical processing has been carefully checked.

85. The duties of the senior official of the unsealing and resealing group include:

a) receiving correspondence from screeners and handing it over for further processing;

b) apportioning work among staff members;

c) monitoring the quality of unsealing and resealing, and routinely training staff members to improve their skills;

d) maintaining technical equipment in proper working order;

e) keeping records of the group’s work.

At sites where groups are not established, the duties listed here are to be assigned to the senior official.

86. Site directors (group heads) are to routinely check the quality of unsealing and resealing via a daily selective inspection in the amount of: group heads —800–1,000 letters; site director (senior official)—400–600 letters.

**B. Technical Monitoring**

87. Before being sent to their address, all letters inspected by the “PK” [site], including postcards, must be checked by technical monitors allocated to all sites with more than 10 employees.

88. The technical monitor is to examine each document individually, with particular attention paid to the following:

a) how the flaps of the envelope fit together;

b) whether the rims of postmarks and other stamps match;

c) whether any excess glue has emerged from under the flaps;

d) whether the letter has any marks on it;

e) whether there is any trace of the letter having been unsealed, etc.

89. The technical monitor must not allow letters processed in violation of technical rules to proceed to their address. He must detain such letters and turn them over to the director (senior official) of the “PK” site.

19

[page break]

90. The technical monitor reports to the site director (senior official) and receives work instructions directly from him.

At the end of the working day, the technical monitor is to prepare a report on the number of documents he has rejected, indicating the nature of the defects detected.

91. At sites where monitors have not been allocated, their functions are to be performed by the site’s (group’s) senior official.

**VI. Recordkeeping and Reporting**

92. “PK” sites are to keep daily records of work performed. The screening group shall keep count of the quantity of correspondence inspected and the number of documents that have been screened. Unsealing and resealing groups are to keep count of the number of documents they have processed.

The chemical processing group is to keep count of the number of documents it has inspected and how many instances of secret writing have been detected.

A separate log should be used to register documents in which secret writing has been detected, indicating addressees, what method of secret writing was (presumably) used, the means by which it was detected, the nature of the secret writing (operationally valuable, intimate, etc.), and where the document was sent.

93. In reading groups, each monitor is to keep records and, by the end of the day, to prepare a report in the following format:

a) the number of letters monitored;

b) the number of letters subject to “K”;

c) the number of letters selected for operational use;

d) the number of letters containing anti-Soviet and politically harmful statements;

e) the number of letters selected for thematic information.

For thematic information, letters are to be selected in accordance with assignments given by “V” departments (divisions) of the NKGB-UNKGB to “PK” sites for a certain period of time. Likewise subject to selection are letters that may be of informational interest in the opinion of the monitors themselves.

The report should indicate the total number of such letters and their classification by subject. For example: reports of malfunctions at Plant № ..., reports from collective farmers about preparations for the spring sowing, complaints from disabled Patriotic War veterans, etc.

94. At the end of the working day, the monitor is to submit a daily report, filled out in accordance with the indicated format (Form № 1) and signed, to the senior official of the group (site). The latter is to summarize these in the dai-

20

[page break]

-ly group (site) report (Form № 2), and to turn this over to the director of the “V” Department (division) of the NKGB-UNKGB.

“PK” sites and “V” departments (divisions) of the NKGB-UNKGB are also to prepare monthly reports (Form № 3).

95. “PK” sites are to send their monthly report to “V” departments (divisions) of the NKGB-UNKGB no later than the 3rd of each month.

Republic-level, territorial, or regional summary reports are to be sent, signed by people’s commissars and directors of the UNKGB, to the “V” Department of the NKGB-UNKGB of the USSR no later than the 10th of each month.

Once per quarter, “V” departments (divisions) of the NKGB-UNKGB shall submit to the “V” Department of the NKGB of the USSR a report on the results of the operational use of “PK” materials in the following format: a) the number of persons arrested, b) the number of files opened, c) the number of persons taken account of in operational records (by operational departments), and d) the number of recruitments performed.

Form №№ 1, 2, and 3 are **attached**.

Director of the “V” Department of the NKGB of the USSR

Major-General **GRIBOV**

21

[page break]

**TOP SECRET**

Form № 1

Attachment to Instructions

**MONITOR’S DAILY REPORT**

for « » . . . . . . 1946

Surname . . . . . . . .

№ . . . . .

1. Number of documents screened
2. Number subject to “K”
3. Number of documents selected for operational use
4. Number of documents containing anti-Soviet and politically harmful statements
5. Number of documents selected for thematic information

Including on the following topics:

a) on malfunctions at factory №

b) complaints of disabled Patriotic War veterans etc.

Signature . . . . . .

Form № 2

**DAILY REPORT**

**of division – site (group)**

for « » . . . . . . 1946

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(designation of division (site))

1. Number of documents screened
2. Number of documents subject to “K”
3. Number of documents selected for operational use
4. Number of documents containing anti-Soviet and politically harmful statements
5. Number of documents selected for thematic information

Including on the following topics:

a) on malfunctions at factory №

b) complaints of disabled Patriotic War veterans etc.

Signature . . . . . .

22

[page break]

Form № 3

**MONTHLY REPORT**

**on the work of division (“PK” site) . . . . . . .**

“V” DEPARTMENT of the NKGB-UNKGB for the . . . . . . region, territory, republic

for « » . . . . . . 1946

1. Number of documents screened
2. Number of documents subject to “K”

III. Number of documents selected for operational use

IV. Number of documents containing anti-Soviet and politically harmful statements

V. Number of documents selected for thematic information

Including on the following topics:

a) on malfunctions at factory №

b) complaints of disabled Patriotic War veterans

VI. Use of “PK” materials

1. Total number of memoranda written including those SENT TO:

a) agencies of the NKGB

b) agencies of the NKVD

c) agencies of the “Smersh” Counterintelligence Unit of the NKO and NKVMF

2. Topical special communiques issued including those SENT TO:

a) agencies of the NKGB

b) agencies of the NKVD

c) agencies of the “Smersh” Counterintelligence Unit of the NKO and NKVMF

3. Special communiques issued for the information of the secretary of the Regional Committee of the VKP(b)

1. Screening work
2. Total number of documents screened
3. Number of documents selected per assignments
4. Number of anonymous anti-Soviet letters and leaflets detained
5. Number of authors of anonymous anti-Soviet letters and leaflets discovered (indicate the methods by which these were discovered)

23

[page break]

VIII. Work of the “TS” group

1. Number of documents processed
2. Number of instances of “TS” detected

Including of operation value

IX. Quality control

1. Number of documents rechecked during selection (indicate who rechecked them)
2. Number of lapses discovered
3. Number of documents rechecked during technical processing (indicate who rechecked them)
4. Defects discovered (indicate the nature of the defects)

Х. Measures taken vis-à-vis persons to blame for defects, and to remedy defects discovered

XI. Understaffing

| Position title | Permanent staff | Availability as of the end of the month | Understaffing |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

XII. Personnel turnover

1. Persons hired during the month under report
2. Persons dismissed and transferred to other departments during the month under report

XIII. Inspections made of peripheral sites

(indicate which sites, and who inspected them, with appended copies of inspection certificates)

XIV. Staff development and political-educational work (number of training sessions, lectures, reports, operational meetings, and the topics thereof)

(signature)