Analyzing the Danger Zones of Canadian Defence Policy

by

Matthew Yip

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Bachelor of Arts

in

Political Science

Department of Political Science
University of Alberta
Dr. Greg Anderson
Supervisor: Dr. John Church

Abstract

The focus of this work is on analyzing Canadian defence policy and specifically, its capability to produce the desired policy outcomes. This work is oriented around providing insight into the primary influences/determinants that produce these specific outcomes. Utilizing a more general policy perspective to analyze the defence policy process, this analysis examines what variables within the Canadian context inhibit the implementation of defence policy.

By focusing on the F-35 fighter jet and the process it underwent that was kickstarted by *Canada First Defence Strategy* and working backwards, an idea can be formed as to why the produced outcomes did not meet the intended outcomes. To aid this analysis, a framework was developed that deploys Matland's (1995) Ambiguity-Conflict model, Hogwood and Gunn (1984) conditions for perfect implementation, McConnell's (2010) scale of success and failure and the 3I+E framework to break down the policy process and analyze each stage.

Acknowledgements

Embarking on this project has been easily the most challenging but rewarding experience in my undergraduate degree. The opportunity to execute a project like this in an undergraduate degree has taught me invaluable lessons that will aid me in my future endeavours. More importantly, though this would not have been possible without the assistance and advice from so many people. To use the old cliché of "it takes a village to raise a child" this project is no different.

To my friends who have helped me here and there with things related to my project thank you. Whether it be reviewing some of my work, allowing me to talk to you about whether what I am doing makes sense or just helping me solve problems, thank you. Embarking on something like this can get lonely at times and it becomes easy to lose sight of the audience. Allowing me to test some of my ideas for feedback on you before formally pursuing them saved me from a lot of things.

On the academic side of things, first and foremost I'd like to thank my supervisor, Dr. John Church for supervising this project. Your advice and guidance throughout this process have been invaluable and your willingness to help me always is greatly appreciated. Even more importantly, your advice about my future paths and the life advice you have dropped on me throughout not just this year, but years past have been even more valuable. Additionally, I'd like

to thank Luke Sandle, your mentorship through this past year has been equally as valuable. All the small details you've assisted me with this past year and advice about the transition for my education beyond this year have been invaluable. Supplementally, I'd also like to thank Dr. Greg Anderson for not only your additional help in the execution of this project but also your assistance in guiding me through the University system.

Lastly, this would not have been possible without the support of my family. To my Grandparents, the work you've put int through your lives to allow not only me but also Jennifer and Jasmine to pursue post-secondary education without any consideration for the finances is a testament to your dedication and will to want the best for all three of us. The sacrifices you have made throughout your lives to ensure the best outcomes for my parents, my sisters and I are greatly appreciated, to say the least. To Mom and Dad, ensuring that all three of us kids have been able to pursue an education at the University of Alberta and allowing us to only focus on our education has been incredibly vital. I would not have been able to get an education if it was not for your contribution.

Table of Contents

List of Figures/Tables

Chapter I

Introduction

The history of Canada's defence policy has been fraught with the reversal of policy decisions and consistent setbacks to its policy process (Marsh 1990, 4). Often these decisions produce a significant amount of media and political attention and regularly become election issues (Juneau et al 2020, 1). In a time where conflict between nation-states is a re-merging possibility, the capability to fully implement policy solutions in response to defined problems within defence policy has become increasingly paramount. Furthermore, understanding why a policy is successfully or not successfully implemented is critical in fixing the problem because to correct problems in a process, a strong understanding of the mechanisms behind these problems is needed.

Canadian defence policy has a storied history of controversial decisions and puzzling setbacks. One of the most controversial decisions in Canadian defence policy revolves around the CF-105 Avro Arrow and the surrounding programme that was cancelled in 1959 by John Diefenbaker (Story & Isinger 2007, 1025). The Avro Arrow has been described as an extremely advanced fighter for its time and possessed features that did not appear in other aircraft for some time (Campagna 2019,45).

A popular folklore-like narrative around the decision to cancel the Arrow is that John Diefenbaker had succumbed to pressure from the United States to adopt American weapons,

abandoned the Canadian defence industry, and compromised Canada's capability to be a leader in military aviation (Story & Isinger 2007, 1026). This argument that American influence was the primary reason that the Avro Arrow was cancelled has persisted in the decades following the cancellation of the Avro Arrow (Campagna 2019, 46). The principle of the popular folklore narrative surrounding Avro Arrow's cancellation is that a defence decision was influenced primarily by outside actors who pressured Canadian decision-makers to scrap the program. That John Diefenbaker had decided to cancel the Avro Arrow program to appease American policymakers and the programme was inundated with political considerations that were the primary influence regarding the final decision and outcome of the programme, not the capability of the Arrow itself (Campagna 2019, 56).

Over the years, this narrative has been contested and alternative explanations have been presented for the cancellation of the Avro Arrow. Campagna (2019) states that the primary grounds for cancellation were military grounds (61). The primary justification for cancelling the Avro Arrow revolves around a shift in doctrine from the perceived primary threat stemming from bombers to a new domain of missiles, eliminating the operational niche the Avro Arrow was envisioned to have (Campagna 2019, 84). At the time, it was strongly believed that the primary threat North America was facing was shifting from traditional bombers to missiles thus rendering interceptors like the Avro Arrow obsolete (Campagna 2019, 60). The logic presented was that if the utility of the bomber was declining because of missiles, the utility of the Avro Arrow would decline as well (Campagna 2010, 61).

Despite alternative explanations existing for the cancellation of the Avro Arrow, the notion that considerations other than pure military grounds influenced this decision continues to persist in the public sphere as a true narrative. The continued persistence of this narrative despite alternative explanations existing might be because there is an element of truth in the notion that defence decisions in Canada are not necessarily made with defence outcomes being the primary objective.

The history of Canadian defence policy in recent history shows a consistent inability of the Canadian government to deliver on its policy promises. Chapnick and Stone (2020) when discussing Canada's early withdrawal from Afghanistan and cutting its losses and leaving before the job was done describe this decision as hardly unique (82). They state that the decision by a government to "disavow its own statement of defence policy is hardly unique in Canada's history" (Chapnick & Stone 2020, 82).

Furthermore, Lang (2017) states that the last four defence policy statements (referring to the Mulroney Government's *A Defence Policy for Canada* (1987), the Chrétien Government's *White Paper on Defence* (1994), the Martin Government's *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* and the Harper Government's *Canada First Defence Strategy* (2008)) had a shelf life of less than a few months each and could arguably measure the lifespan by months and not years. The short lifespan of defence policy papers is a troubling reality as most of these created a long-term agenda for Canada's military because the identified necessary changes often take years if not decades to be able to implement (Lang 2017).

This reality of long-term policy plans lasting only a few years at best suggests that something is wrong with the Canadian defence policy process. Additionally, the persistence of this problem through various governments and political parties indicates a far more pervasive inability to successfully implement policy than a single government's inability to perform. It is rather clear that the Canadian government has been inconsistent in promoting a cohesive, and credible vision of defence policy within these defence whitepapers and often fails to produce a credible strategy that can produce policy outcomes (Chapman 2019, 7). It raises the question as to why Canadian defence policy often fails to produce its intended policy outcomes and more importantly what influences the decisions in the policy process that produce these outcomes.

The security situation within the world has fundamentally shifted over the past year because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This presented some challenges in choosing exactly which policy document to examine as defence issues and the overall defence environment increasingly shifted over the course of writing this thesis. This whitepaper was issued two years after the Harper government assumed power and was the guiding document for the Harper government's tenure in power (Macdonald 2009, 1).

Supplementally, the follow-up policy document, *Strong, Secure, Engaged* does not invalidate much of the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, rather it promises what was already promised but not delivered (Kilford 2017, 5). The subsequent defence policy document identifies similar capability requirements to meet similar objectives, this stability of principles over policy

documents beginning with *Canada First Defence Strategy* represents a good opportunity to analyze the entire defence policy process (Kilford 2017, 5).

Analyzing the policy process behind the *Canada First Defence Strategy* could reveal some of the factors that aid in trying to answer exactly why Canadian defence policy often seems to struggle in implementing its goals. Working to identify key decisions that produced the outcomes or lack of intended outcomes and then exploring why these decisions were made can produce relevant findings. Quite often, understanding why an outcome occurs is just as important as the outcome itself. Understanding and identifying the mechanisms that are conducive to successful policy implementation and mechanisms that inhibit the policy process is vitally important. By going through the policy process of the *Canada First Defence Strategy* and analyzing it through theoretical policy frameworks, gaining a better understanding idea of why Canadian defence policy often fails to be coherent should be possible.

Chapter II

Literature Review

The purpose of a policy is to produce desirable outcomes that are meant to solve self-identified problems. It is well understood though that policy does not always produce everything it desires. Framing this characteristic of policy, Dunsire (1972) provides a base definition of what he calls the implementation gap stating that "an output different in quantity, quality or direction from that intended is produced" (18). Dunsire (1972) further states that policy functions to solve a problem which infers an envisioned output from a governmental agency that if deployed will in some way solve the problem (18).

The overall objective of defining an implementation gap is understanding an agency's capability to deliver on policies that are agreed to by measuring the output intended and comparing it with the achievements and accounting for the difference if it exists (Dunsire 1972, 18). To accomplish this, the focus tends to be on identifying conditions that are conducive to producing the desired output (Dunsire 1972, 18). Consequently, identifying inhibiting factors to successful implementation can also serve a purpose despite Dunsire (1972) explicitly not stating inhibiting factors as something to consider.

Within the context of Canadian defence policy, there is a unique term that encompasses Dunsire's (1972) implementation gap definition. This is coined the commitment capability hap which functions as an application of Dunsire's (1972) work regarding the implementation gap

but is defined strictly within the Canadian defence policy environment. This concept specifically refers to the tendency of the Canadian government to rarely provide the military with enough resources to meet the defined policy objectives (Chapnick et al 2020, 87). This capability gap uses the same reference points as Dunsire's (1972) work with defining policy outcomes in relation to policy objectives. The existence of a unique applied definition of the implementation gap within the Canadian defence policy process does suggest that the occurrence is common enough to warrant such a definition.

Understanding the environment in which these concepts exist is important. The Canadian defence policy differs from other defence policies in certain ways. An important distinction to make is that, unlike the United States which produces a defence strategy, Canada produces a defence policy (Rodman 2020, 276). Hoffman (2014) states strategy functions to ensure that policy and strategic machinery are aligned and in working order (484). A strategy is comprised of a series or sequence of national policies forwarded by the government that are oriented around identifying and defining problems (Chapnick & Stone 2020, 83). Within the Canadian context, defence policy has typically been articulated through a white paper or a public speech which then triggers a strategy formulation process (Chapnick & Stone 2020, 83).

Rodman (2020) in reference to Canada's relationship with the concept of strategy and policy states that Canada rarely produces publicly available written guidance or white papers that are about defence (275). Furthermore, even internally written policy guidance is sparse in relation to the standards of the United States (Rodman 2020, 275). Even when a policy document

exists, it rarely engages with the ends, means and methods in a way that is conducive to producing a comprehensive defence strategy and because of this Rodman (2020) defines Canada's defence environment as one that produces defence policy, not defence strategy (276).

Strategy often possesses an internal logic that creates a bridge between policy and the ways and means to create desired effects (Hoffman 2014, 479). This intricately links the concept of strategy with the process of implementation and the Canadian characteristic of producing policy without strategy has direct negative implications on the capability to successfully implement defence policy. This Canadian characteristic of producing policy rather than strategy opens a window to explore and explore reasons why this occurs.

Additionally, understanding how the defence policy process functions is critical to start an analysis of Canadian defence policy. The mechanisms, relationships and responsibilities between various actors need to be understood. The government's role in defence policy is to set the agenda by prescribing the purpose of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and what they should be able to do (Hartfiel 2010, 325). Hartfiel (2010) further states that policy objectives are formally expressed within National Defence white papers which represent the government's official defence policy and are updated on an ad hoc basis and often early on in a new government's mandate (325). These whitepapers create a framework to work around and once it has been established, the Department of National Defence (DND) becomes responsible for implementing these policies (Hartfiel 2010, 325).

Establishing that the federal government is responsible for agenda setting and prescribing goals and the DND is responsible for implementation is an important distinction to make. This separates the responsibility of who is responsible for policymaking and those who are responsible for the implementation process. This characteristic of defence policy implies that for outcomes to be achieved, both policymaking and implementation need to possess some level of synchronization with each other for outcomes to match policy goals. Wildavsky and Pressman (1973) reaffirm this implication by stating that "separation of policy design from implementation is fatal" (XVII).

Furthermore, examining exactly what implementation entails, Wildavsky and Pressman (1973) say that implementation is a process of interaction between the setting of goals and the actions geared towards producing/achieving these desired outcomes (XV). Implementation though is not the creation of the initial conditions necessary to produce outcomes, the production of conditions requires legislation and funding to be committed (Wildavsky & Pressman 1973, XIV).

The responsibility for the creation of the conditions thus becomes the responsibility of politicians as policymakers in this case and politicians and implementers are responsible for producing predicted consequences after the initial conditions have been met (Wildavsky & Pressman 1973, XIV). This process of producing necessary conditions is defined as a program, it indicates the conversion of a hypothesis into governmental action and indicates authorization of a premise (Wildavsky & Pressman 1973, XIV). The work that Wildavsky & Pressman (1973)

creates a flow of the policy process that is as follows; policy design → programs → implementation, which then leads to outcomes.

The limitations of Wildavsky & Pressman (1973) are quite clear though; their work assumes perfect implementation and complete competency regarding the implementing agencies capability to produce outcomes. In effect, Wildavsky & Pressman (1973) assume complete efficiency on behalf of the implementing agency to turn solutions created by policymakers into outcomes oriented at solving problems. Hogwood & Gunn (1984) which will be introduced and further explained later provide the necessary negation to this assumption.

Both policy design/agenda setting and implementation have various conditions that influence the outcome. A variety of literature exists that examines both processes separately from each other but given the characteristic of Canadian defence policy with implementation and policymaking being done by separate parties, literature that links the policymaking process to the implementation process and vice versa is needed. Matland (1995) examined the environments within which policy implementation occurs and identified that the primary considerations within the implementation process are the ambiguity of the policy and the level of conflict (155-156). This model that represents policy ambiguity and conflict is defined by Matland (1995) as the ambiguity-conflict model (160).

Conflict is described as needing an interdependence of actors, incompatibility of objectives and a perceived zero-sum element to interactions (Matland qtd. Dahrendorf 1995,

156). Additionally, conflict will exist when more than a single organization sees policy as something that is directly related to their interests and when incongruent views exist between multiple organizations (Matland 1995, 156). Conflict can also arise even if an agreed-upon goal exists. In this scenario, conflict shifts to the differing methods of achieving the goal (Matland 1995, 156-157).

Regarding policy ambiguity, Matland (1995) states that ambiguity has two primary types: the ambiguity of the goal and the ambiguity of the means (157). Ambiguity often creates misunderstandings and uncertainty and is often culpable in implementation failure (Matland 1995, 157-158). Within the ambiguity of goals, an interesting phenomenon exists; the more explicit a policy becomes, the more likely the actors will identify threats to their turf and begin to act in a defensive manner that potentially disrupts implementation (Matland 1995, 158). The concept of ambiguity of means refers to uncertainty regarding the relationship of what roles various organizations have within the implementation processes or when an environment is so complex it obscures the identification of what tools to use and their effect on the desired outcomes (Matland 1995, 158).

Matland (1995) suggests that within some conditions ambiguity of goals is necessary to get policies passed through the political process (158). Sufficient ambiguity of goals can allow a diverse set of actors and interests to interpret the same policy in many ways (Matland 1995, 158). Most importantly Matland (1995) states that the degree of ambiguity inherent within a policy directly influences the implementation process in the following ways: “the ability of superiors to

monitor activities, the likelihood the policy is universally understood through many implementation sites, the probability that local factors will play a role and the amount to which relevant actors vary sharply across implementation sites" (159).

With these two components of the implementation process, Matland (1995) creates the ambiguity-conflict model of the implementation process. Here Matland (1995) cross-references possible scenarios for implementation regarding the amounts of ambiguity and conflict within the environment. The possible scenarios that Matland (1995) envisions are as follows: administrative implementation with low policy ambiguity and low policy conflict; political implementation with low policy ambiguity and high policy conflict; experimental implementation with high policy ambiguity and low policy conflict; and, symbolic implementation with high policy ambiguity and high policy conflict (160).

For each potential scenario, Matland (1995) identifies the primary determinant of outcomes. For administrative implementation, Matland (1995) states that resources are the primary determinant of outcomes (160). The primary determinant for political implementation is that power determines outcomes (Matland 1995, 163). Within experimental implementation, contextual conditions dominate the process (Matland 1995, 165). In the last scenario, symbolic implementation sees the coalition strength becoming the primary determinant of an outcome (Matland 1995, 168).

One limitation of Matland's (1995) ambiguity-conflict model within the context of defence policy involves the scenario of symbolic implementation (168). This scenario is similar to political implementation with the primary distinction being that within symbolic implementation the primary determining factor for outcomes occurs at a micro level (Matland 1995, 170). The micro level is described as the local level involving local actors (Matland 1995, 170).

Within defence policy, local-level interactions between local actors do not necessarily exist in a broad sense. There may be specific scenarios where there is an intersection between local-level actors interacting with the defence policy process and acting as a primary constraint to outcomes. For example, if the DND wanted to build an urban military base in response to defence policy identifying a more urban presence as a pressing need, local-level actors may become a constraining factor on the capability to produce an outcome to satisfy the desired requirement. These types of hypothetical scenarios are extremely specific case studies within the policy process and their impact on the macro-level processes and overall outcomes may not be relevant to the analysis of the macro-level processes.

Despite this potential limitation, Matland's (1995) ambiguity-conflict model identifies what in theory should be the primary determinants of the policy outcome regarding the implementation process. Identifying the primary constraint in the implementation process has implications for the policy-making side of the process. It points the analysis of inhibiting factors of successful implementation towards a general direction that can help contain the analysis. The

ambiguity-conflict model offers a promising way to link the implementation process to the policy-making process.

Hogwood and Gunn (1984) provide further literature regarding the implementation process by identifying 10 conditions that lead to perfect implementation. One key distinction Hogwood and Gunn (1984) make is the difference between non-implementation and unsuccessful implementation (197). The former refers to when a policy is not deployed as intended possibly because possibly those involved in the execution have been either uncooperative or inefficient (Hogwood & Gunn 1984, 197). Unsuccessful implementation refers to when a policy is deployed but fails to produce the intended outcomes (Hogwood & Gunn 1984, 197).

In addition to differentiating non-implementation and unsuccessful implementation, Hogwood and Gunn (1984) lay out some conditions for perfect implementation (198). Perfect implementation is a concept that Hogwood and Gunn (1984) state as something that is unattainable and more of a theoretical framework rather than something to be achieved (198). The conditions that Hogwood and Gunn (1984) lay out that can lead to perfect implementation are as follows:

- "Circumstances external to implementing agency did not impose crippling constraints; adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to the program;
- the required combination of resources is available;

- the policy that is to be implemented is based on a valid theory of cause and effect relationship;
- relationship between cause and effect is direct and there are few if any intervening links;
- dependency relationships are minimal;
- understanding of and agreement on objectives;
- tasks are fully specified and in the correct sequence;
- there is perfect communication and coordination;
- those in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance" (199-206).

Hogwood and Gunn (1984) provide another way to contextualize the implementation process that defence policy can go through. Although perfect implementation is extremely unlikely exist, understanding what in theory needs to occur for perfect implementation to occur can lend some idea of how successful the implementation of Canadian defence policy is and more importantly what conditions have not been met that are needed for successful implementation. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) lay out a way to deconstruct the implementation process that appears to be fundamental towards being able to link the policy-making process and the implementation process.

Evaluation of the success of both the agenda-setting process and the implementation process of Canadian defence policy inherently involves a scale of success and failure. McConnell (2010) introduces a scale of success and failure to evaluate the entire policy process that links the agenda-setting goals to the implementation processes' outcomes and the ability to these

outcomes. This process is a difficult one and involves judgment decisions regarding how exactly to classify policy outcomes.

McConnell (2010) provides a base definition of policy success stating, “A policy is successful if it achieves the goals that proponents set out to achieve and attracts no criticism of any significance and/or is virtually universal” (351). McConnell (2010) further supplements this base definition of policy success by creating a scale of success and failure to properly account for the non-binary nature of success and failure. McConnell (2010) creates five scenarios of success and failure and is as follows: program success, resilient success, conflicted success, precarious success, and process failure (354). Table 1 below provides a summary of all the conditions associated with each state of outcomes that McConnell (2010) creates.

Table 1 McConnell (2010) Scale of Success and Failure

Policy success	Resilient Success	Conflicted Success	Precarious Success	Policy Failure
Implementation in line with objectives	Implementation objectives broadly achieved, despite minor refinements or deviations	Mixed results with some successes, but accompanied by unexpected controversial problems.	Minor progress towards implementation as intended but beset by chronic failures, proving to be highly controversial and very difficult to defined	Implementation fails to be executed in line with objectives
Achievement of desired outcomes	Outcomes broadly achieved, despite some shortfalls	Some successes, but the partial achievement of intended outcomes is counterbalanced by unwanted results generating substantial controversy . Partial benefits realised but not as widespread or deep as intended	Some small outcomes achieved as intended, but overwhelmed by controversial and high profile instances or failure to produce results	Failure to achieve desired outcomes
Creating benefit for a target group	A few shortfalls and possibly some anomalous cases, but intended target group broadly benefits	Partial achievement of goals, but accompanied by failures to achieve with possibility of high profile examples	Small benefits are accompanied and overshadowed by damage to the very group that was meant to benefit. Also likely to generate high profile stories of unfairness and suffering.	Damaging a particular target group
Meets policy domain criteria	Not quite the outcome desired but close enough to lay strong claim to fulfilling criteria	Box intentionally left blank	A few minor successes but plagued by unwanted media attention	Clear inability to meet the criteria
Opposition to program aims, values, and means of achieving them is virtually non-existent and or support is virtually universal	Opposition to program aims, values and means of achieving them is stronger than anticipated but outweighed by support.	Box intentionally left blank	Opposition to program aims, values, and means of achieving them, outweighs small levels of support.	Opposition to program aims, values and means of achieving them is virtually universal, and/or support is virtually non-existent

Table 1: Summary of the conditions for the outcomes associated with each policy outcome outlined by McConnell (2010) in their Scale of Success and Failure (354)

The non-binary scale of success failure that McConnell's (2010) creates is useful in identifying a rough estimation of a policy outcome. Evaluating success and failure in a nonbinary way also should provide a more accurate evaluation than some other definitions of success and failure that primarily treats the concept as binary. There are some limitations though within McConnell's (2010) model of success and failure as later McConnell (2015) acknowledges the weaknesses associated with this scale. McConnell (2015) in a retrospective of their own work

states that “there is no scientific gauge that suddenly indicates danger zones in terms of support” (231). This acknowledgement of weakness by McConnell (2015) when reflecting on their own model suggests this scale should only be used as an approximation of outcomes, not as a hard definitive airtight outcome definition.

Additionally, the conclusions regarding success and failure McConnell (2010) makes combine the success of policymaking with the ability to implement. While doing this may be appropriate in most scenarios where implementation and policymaking are the responsibility of the same party, it is not appropriate in the defence environment. With the separation of responsibility for policymaking and the implementation of said policy, combining the evaluation of both processes does not represent a useful way to evaluate why defence policy fails.

Bovens et al (2001) help rectify this by identifying two different evaluations of success and failure within policymaking. These two dimensions are defined as a programmatic mode of assessment and a political mode of assessment (Bovens et al 2001, 20). The programmatic approach considers the effectiveness, efficiency, and resiliency of the policies (Bovens et al 2001, 20). The political mode of assessment considers to the way policies and policymakers are represented within the political arena (Bovens et al 2001, 20).

These two modes of assessment are intertwined with each other, Bovens et al (2001) state that the recognition of programmatic outcomes is determined within the political process (20). In addition, the definition of success and failure are dependent on temporal, spatial, cultural and

political factors, all of which must be considered when examining a policy's implementation (Bovens et al 2001, 20).

Bovens et al (2001) introduce additional considerations when assessing a policy's implementation and outcome. One consideration they introduce is that any analysis of a policy's success and failure is ultimately a political judgement (Bovens et al 2001, 10). It is also stated that the political evaluation of a programme do not necessarily match up with the actual performance of a programme or policy because politics have their own logic and dynamics (Bovens et al 2001, 10).

Bovens et al (2001) distinction between programmatic and political outcomes are important distinctions to be made when evaluating the policy process. The distinction between programmatic outcomes and political outcomes functions well with how Canadian defence policy is created. Programmatic outcomes solely focus on the success of implementation whereas political outcomes focus more on the validity and principles of the policy and the intangible components of policymaking.

The previous literature described is all oriented around identifying outcomes but does not offer a sufficient mechanism to survey why these outcomes occurred. Matland (1995) and their ambiguity-conflict model go the furthest in suggesting possible reasons why outcomes occur but only offer a superficial mechanism to analyse why the outcome occurs. The 3I+E Framework offers a different perspective and assists in interrogating outcomes by organizing the information

collected regarding the policy environment and factors that influence the decision-making process in an understandable manner.

Sandhu et al (2021) state that this 3I+E Framework is composed of ideas, interests, institutions, and external forces (2-3). Within the idea's realm, this is represented by ideas and values of what ought to be and an opinion about what is right with these positions being advocated by policymakers, interest groups and the public (Sandhu et al 2021, 3).

Interests are composed of stakeholders that do not possess political power but seek to influence the policy and decision-making process (Sandhu et al 2021, 3). Some types of actors that possess these characteristics include societal interest groups, elected officials, public servants, researchers, and policy entrepreneurs (Lavis 2016, 28).

Institutions refer to the government structure and policy networks in place within the context in question (Sandhu et al 2021, 2). The government structure refers to the political arrangements within a system of government and is concerned with the interactions between the branches of government or political parties (Sandhu et al 2021, 2). Another important component of the institutional pillar of this framework is the effects of policy legacies and policy networks on decision-making processes (Sandhu et al 2021, 3).

The external factors component is a catch-all mechanism that incorporates any other variable or force that can influence the decision-making process that does not fall within the confines of the previous categories. Examples of these variables include political, economic, or technological change and media coverage or the release of reports (Sandhu et al 2021, 3). If these variables impact the decision-making process/policy process, they often do so by focusing on the issue in question or drawing attention away from it (Sandhu et al 2021, 3). The 3I+E framework offers a way to interrogate specific decisions. It is versatile enough and possesses a level of holistic analysis that it can assist in identifying influencing factors behind decisions.

Chapter III

Methodology

Creating a methodology to offer some explanation of the outcomes that the Canadian defence policy process produces presented some challenges. The overall purpose of this methodology was in some way to provide an explanation for the decisions made within the Canadian defence policy process. The literature utilized to analyze the policy process had to be appropriate for the characteristics of Canadian defence policy. Canadian defence policy does appear to be somewhat distinct in relation to American defence policy as stated by Rodman (2020). This created the potential for specific defence policy literature to be inappropriate for the Canadian context because the process that specific literature presumes to be true may not exist in the Canadian context.

This uniqueness of Canadian defence policy created the conscious decision to utilize a more generic public policy lens and literature to develop a different perspective on defence policy. Adopting a more general mode of analysis may present different plausible explanations for outcomes. Approaching a different perspective on a specific domain of public policy has some utility as it could present alternative explanations left untouched by domain-specific literature.

Methodological Flow Chart



Figure 1.1

Figure 1.1 is a visualization of this policy flow identified by Wildavsky & Pressman (1973) and represents a visual idea of the overall framework developed to anaylze the overall process. The boxes at the top represent stages of the policy process with the arrows representing mechanisms necessary to move from one stage to the other. Boxes below indicate the party responsible for the stages in question.

Defence policy functions as a specific application of public policy which should mean that the general principles in analyzing the overall public policy process should hold true when applied to defence policy. Taking this into consideration, the choice was made to develop a unique framework to analyze the entire Canadian defence policy process that examines the relevant and important components of the policy process. This unique framework primarily considered the unique process that Canadian defence policy undergoes whilst being implemented.

The framework created does share similarities to a concept called backwards mapping as defined by Elmore (1979). The methodology created for the purposes of this problem does take a similar approach to backwards mapping as both processes start with the outcomes of the policy process and begin working backwards to answer questions. The key distinction lies in that backwards mapping is concerned with identifying the policymaker's intended primary objective by starting from policy output and working back through the policy process (Elmore 1979). The methodology created functions similarly to backwards mapping but the primary objective here is to identify primary considerations and influences on decision-making and policymakers that produced the outcome. The processes of both methodologies take a similar approach and adopt similar principles in answering a question but are tasked with asking and answering fundamentally different questions.

Beginning the analysis of Canadian defence policy, some key considerations are needed. One of these considerations is exactly who is responsible for what in the Canadian defence policy process. Hartfiel's (2010) work states that the mechanics of Canadian defence policy sees the federal government responsible for setting the objectives for the CAF and establishing defence policy frameworks and the overall agenda of the CAF with the DND being responsible for implementation (325). Additionally, these policy objectives from the government guide decisions that civilian and military defence managers make (Hartfiel 2010, 325). This separation of responsibility is a key consideration when crafting a framework to begin analysing the defence policy environment.

This separation of responsibility for agenda-setting/policy design and implementation requires a separation of analysis for both parties. Furthermore, Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973) assertion that policy design must consider the implementation process and a failure to do so is fatal must also be considered. That the considerations of implementation must be understood when designing policy and furthermore good ideas have no point if they cannot be carried out (Pressman & Wildavsky 1973, 143).

Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) through drawing a link between policymaking and implementation identify a crucial relationship for the analysis of Canadian Defence Policy. The principle regarding the relationship between policymaking and implementation that Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) in tandem with Hartfiel's (2010) analysis of the mechanics behind Canadian defence policy provided critical principles and considerations that guided the development of a framework to analyze Canadian defence policy.

Furthermore, strong consideration of the policy process that Wildavsky and Pressman (1973) prescribed was given. The overall process of policy design → programs → implementation → outcomes was the primary consideration when designing this framework. Wildavsky and Pressman (1973) state that each stage of this process is interrelated forwards and backwards thus an analysis of this entire process to produce explanations requires literature to not only target each specific stage of the policy process but also target the relationships between each stage. Table 2 below provides a summary of all the conceptual frameworks utilized within the framework and their intended purposes and objective in the pursuit of understanding the Canadian defence policy environment.

Summary Table of Frameworks

Conceptual Framework	Purpose/Objective
Matland (1995) Ambiguity Conflict Model	Identify primary constraints on successful implementation
Hogwood and Gunn (1984) Conditions for perfect implementation	Analyze relationships between policy makers and implementing agency. Creates necessary linkages between both agencies
McConnell (2010) Scale of Success and Failure	Paint a rough picture of policy outcome in relation to objectives. Provides a rough idea of how successful the implementation was and the level of resistance associated with the process
Sandhu +Levi (2021) 3I+E framework	Identify considerations/influences that informed and influenced decisions made by policymakers to produce the defined outcome

Table 2 represents a summary of all the frameworks incorporated in the methodology.

The principles outlined create a scenario where implementation and agenda setting must be analyzed separately to establish responsibility but also simultaneously to understand the relationship between the DND and the federal government. The frameworks used to analyse either of the processes must in some way consider the other component of policymaking. Matland's (1995) presents an opportunity to begin the analysis through his ambiguity-conflict

model. This model through examining the environment in that implementation can occur and identifying the most likely constraints does perform a few critical functions.



Figure 1.2

Figure 1.2 identifies where Matland's (1995) conflict ambiguity model takes place within the policy process. The green arrows indicate the party responsible for the components in question. Red arrows represent the mechanisms that Matland's (1995) framework analyses/ targets and contextualizes the processes. This structure will continue for the rest of this chapter.

The first function is that it helps contextualize the implementation process in relation to the consequences of decisions made within the policy-making process. The two key variables, conflict and ambiguity within this specific environment are all considerations the federal government must be able to either navigate or utilize when deploying policy and the government's ability to wield these variables have direct implications on DND's capability to implement policy into tangible outcomes.

The second is identifying what the primary constraints to implementation should be, it points the analysis in a general direction of a possible reason to explain outcomes. It's not a definitive catch-all reason, the key constraints Matland (1995) gives for each scenario are vague. For example, the key constraint for administrative implementation cites resources as the primary constraint to implementation. Within this context, this would mean that a reason why the DND cannot fully implement things is that it does not have the resources necessary to implement policy.

That's a single part of the puzzle of the defence policy process but still leaves the question of why in particular it is resources that are the primary constraint on implementation. In other words, what are the decisions made by policymakers to produce these constraints and for what reasons remain unanswered after the utilization of the ambiguity-conflict model. The ambiguity-conflict model only answers a single component part of the question although it is a crucial part, it leaves the more important questions unanswered.

Furthermore, the ambiguity-conflict model remains uncontextualized in reference to the concept of implementation. Hogwood and Gunn's (1984) 10 conditions for perfect implementation provide a necessary reference point for perfect implementation. Although Hogwood and Gunn (1984) clearly state that perfect implementation is highly unlikely, a reference point to the concept of perfect implementation does aid in painting an overall picture of the characteristics of the implementation that Canadian defence policy undergoes. Looking at the 10 conditions that Hogwood and Gunn (1984) identify as necessary for perfect implementation

and then identifying which of these variables that are relevant to Canadian defence policy frames the implementation of Canadian defence policy.



Figure 1.3

Figure 1.3 identifies what mechanisms Hogwood and Gunn (1984) analyzes. It focuses in on the relationship between the Policy Makers/ Decision Makers and the Implementing Agency. It provides a look at the validity of the programs put forward by the policymakers and provides a way to answer the question of if the implementing agency was put in a position to succeed.

Hogwood and Gunn's (1984) 10 conditions for perfect implementation also provide necessary implications on the policymaking side of the policy process. The focus of some of the 10 conditions is not solely on the implementing agency's capability it also implicates the validity of the policy put forward. Specifically, the condition that the policy must be based on a valid theory of cause and effect does not implicate the implementing agency's capabilities, rather it places the responsibility of implementation on policymakers' competence (Hogwood & Gunn 1984, 201).

Other conditions that implicate policymakers' decisions include the requirement that tasks are fully specified in the correct sequence and that adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to the programme (Hogwood & Gunn 1984, 199-205). The framing of the relationship between the implementing agencies and those responsible for designing a policy within Hogwood & Gunn's (1984) work matches the principles that Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) identify as a necessary component of policy design. The conditions outlined by Hogwood & Gunn (1984) draw the necessary links between policymakers and those responsible for implementation and allow for an analysis of both actors to understand if there is sufficient synchronization from both parties to produce sufficient intended outcomes.

Hogwood & Gunn's (1984) work is appropriate for an analysis of the Canadian defence policy process; they provide the necessary linkages between policymakers and implementing agencies while simultaneously framing the implementation process. Additionally, it supplements the ambiguity-conflict model by drawing further implications regarding decision-making that directly impacts the implementation process. It provides more specific areas of decision-making that could impair the capability to implement policy.

With the framing of the policy process that Hogwood & Gunn (1984) provide in tandem with the ambiguity-conflict model and cross-referencing it to the overall outcomes outlined within the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, it becomes possible to frame the policy outcomes onto a scale of success and failure. McConnell's (2010) work and his scale of success and failure represent an appropriate way to frame the overall policy outcomes in a non-binary way. It would

be disingenuous to define an outcome as a failure just because it did not succeed in delivering on all of its intended objectives.

Judging the overall success of outcomes involves some level of judgement, not all objectives within a policy are equally as important to the overall intended impact of a policy. This consideration in tandem with Bovens et al's (2001) distinction between programmatic and political analysis makes McConnell's (2010) scale of success and failure an appropriate choice to approximate the degree of success in the outcomes of the *Canada First Defence Strategy*.

Boven's et al (2001) distinctions between programmatic and political analysis are critical to creating valid definitions of success and failure within this topic. The rationale for including this distinction is derived specifically from the F-35 procurement saga that Canada has gone through. The Harper government never signed a procurement contract to replace the F-35 by the time the Liberals took power despite it being outlined in the *Canada First Defence Strategy* as something that would be procured (Lagassé 2020, 46). The F-35 became a political issue and a focal point in the 2015 election but eventually, the Trudeau government signed a contract to purchase 88 fighters in 2023 (Gillies 2023).

This specific component of the policy history does indicate the necessity of distinctions that Boven's et al (2001) identify between programmatic and political success. On the pure programmatic front, this specific component would be a failure of some sort because of the

significant delay and missed timelines, and strong opposition to the process and goals of this specific component of the *Canada First Defence Strategy*.

In terms of political analysis though, this could be interpreted as some form of success for the policy-makers of the *Canada First Defence Strategy.* This is something they outlined as necessary but faced strong opposition to the idea, but eventually, those who opposed the idea came to the same conclusion that the F-35 was the right choice for Canada. It indicates some validity of the ideas behind the policy and some level of success on the political front. That the principles of the solution/idea to an identified problem remained valid despite its non-implementation. It could be spun as some form of political success in the public sphere for the policymakers of the *Canada First Defence Strategy*.

Furthermore, regarding the last component of the framework, McConnell (2015) acknowledges that certain components of his framework are weak and fallible upon reflection by describing it as lacking a degree of parsimony, indicating that this model should only be used as an approximation of outcomes and not an end-all airtight definition (226). Nonetheless, despite the creator of the framework criticizing components of their own framework, there is still utility in using this scale while acknowledging the limitations inherent to the framework. Placing the programmatic process of certain components of the *Canada First Defence Strategy* onto McConnell's (2010) scale of success and failure provides some idea of the level of success inherent to the outcomes. Doing this allows for a rough estimation of policy outcomes and

creates the opportunity for a loose definition of the policy outcomes of the *Canada First Defence Strategy.*

Producing a loose definition/idea of the overall outcome of the *Canada First Defence Strategy* creates the opportunity to begin analyzing why these outcomes have occurred. The previous literature within this framework has all been oriented around defining and organizing information related to the policy process. With a rough estimation of an outcome being defined via McConnell (2010), pursuing the question of exactly why this outcome was produced becomes possible.

Hogwood and Gunn (1984) and Matland (1995) produce superficial potential explanations of what can constrain the implementation process but offer no mechanism to analyze the decision-making process that policymakers went through to produce these constraints. An analysis of the considerations and influences that influence policymakers' decision-making is necessary to ultimately answer why Canadian Defence Policy tends to fail in producing intended outcomes.

The 3I+E framework functions as a mechanism that examines the considerations that influence the decision-making process. The logic here is that by defining the policy outcomes via McConnell (2010) and identifying the primary constraints to implementation via Matland (1995) and understanding the relationship between policymakers and implementing agencies via

Hogwood & Gunn (1984), it can point to the consequences of decisions made by policymakers that impact the implementation process.



Figure 1.4

Figure 1.4 indicates the placement of the 3I+E framework. It provides a necessary linkage towards understanding the considerations of the policy design and decision-making process. Working from a defined base of the policy design allows for analysis of the considerations decision-makers had when formulating the policy.

Explaining why these decisions were made via the 3I+E framework is the final component of the analysis of the Canadian defence policy process. The 3I+E's pillars of ideas, institutions, interests and external factors function to organize the various considerations that policymakers had when making decisions. Understanding the considerations decision-makers had when producing decisions can ultimately produce some explanations for the causes behind the inability to implement Canadian defence policy. In short, the logic follows that the 3I+E framework identifies what influences policy decisions that produce outcomes which directly implicate the capability to implement policy.

The frameworks identified have some slight overlap in the ground they cover. But each one also presents opportunities to examine certain components of the overall policy process that reveals necessary information to guide the analysis in the right direction. The 3I+E framework analyzes the policy design process, Hogwood and Gunn (1984) provide a way to link policy design, program and implementation, and Matland (1995) provides a mechanism to analyse the relationship between implementation and outcomes.

Each stage of the policy process as defined by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) has literature and mechanisms to analyze both the stages and the relationships between them. It is believed that by doing this and working backwards from the relationship between implementation and outcomes, an overall explanation of the considerations of the policy-design process that led to the outcomes becomes possible. The framework developed here corresponds to the principles developed by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) that policy is developed in unique and distinct stages, but these stages are inherently linked to each other.

There is difficulty in utilizing McConnell's (2010) scale of success and failure due to the limitations inherent to it and the judgement calls required to utilize it. This stage/component of the methodology is most likely the weakest component of the analysis process because of the judgement calls required to utilize the framework. Despite the self-acknowledged weaknesses that McConnell (2015) identifies in using this specific model, there is still utility in using this scale if these limitations are kept in mind.

Overall though, the frameworks chosen represent necessary choices to analyse the entire policy process in a manner that is appropriate to the Canadian defence policy process. The amount of information regarding Canadian defence policy necessitated some frameworks to assist in organizing the information and understanding the relationship and mechanics behind this information. Using the frameworks and principles identified within the methodology and applying them to the *Canada First Defence Strategy* it should paint a picture of the forces behind the policy outcomes and present some plausible explanations for the decision-making process.

Chapter IV

Identification of Decisions

To adhere to the limitations placed on the length of an honours thesis/capstone project, the framework developed will primarily focus on the idea of procuring 65 next-generation fighter jets (Government of Canada 2008, 17). The framework will analyze the process that the F-35 went through as an analysis of all the procurement objectives is not possible given the length limitations. While other components of the *Canada First Defence Strategy* may be superficially analyzed, most of the analysis will focus on the F-35 especially when it comes to using the frameworks that Matland (1995) and McConnell (2010) developed. It is not possible to sufficiently justify decisions made using these frameworks when considering the entire defence policy document.

The decision to primarily focus on this procurement objective is because the idea evolved into the F-35 and serves as the entry of the F-35 into Canadian politics. The F-35 has had a notably contentious relationship with Canada and is one that could be easily described as controversial. An analysis of the process that the F-35 went through that was kick-started by the *Canada First Defence Strategy* could present findings relevant to the entire policy document and furthermore could be extrapolated to Canadian defence policy.

Beginning by working backwards from the policy outcome there needs to be some defined objectives from the *Canada First Defence Strategy*. Adhering to Boven et al's (2001) distinctions between programmatic outcomes and political outcomes, there should be a distinction between pure programmatic objectives and political objectives. The principles between these categories remain the same, programmatic objectives would focus on tangible outcomes like procurement whereas political objectives would be more focused on the ideas and principles of both the problem definition and the solutions forwarded. This in tandem with exploring the levels of conflict and ambiguity inherent to the policy document help to identify the environmental conditions in which the *Canada First Defence Strategy* existed.

On the political front of the policy, the objective was clear; to modernize the CAF via stable predictable funding to enhance the capability to deliver on 6 core missions. These core missions being: "conduct daily domestic and continental operations including in the Arctic and through NORAD; support international events like the 2010 Olympics; respond to a major terrorist attack; support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster; lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period; and deploy forces in responses to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods" (Government of Canada 2008, 3).

The role of the CAF outlined within the document focused on 3 core ideas: defending Canada, defending North America and contributing to international peace and security (Government of Canada 2008, 8). Within the concept of defending Canada, it is stated that the CAF needs to not only identify threats but also be capable of addressing them quickly and

effectively (Government of Canada 2008,7). Supplementally, operating in the Arctic to exercise control and defend sovereignty is stated as a key objective in addition to providing a visible Canadian presence (Government of Canada 2008, 8). The defence of North America focuses on aerospace defence and interoperability in equipment and doctrine with American forces. (Government of Canada 2008, 8). The focus on the international component examines the humanitarian role and non-military role the CAF needs to be able to undertake when operating in unique environments abroad.

To accomplish these operational roles, the *Canada First Defence Strategy* laid out procurement objectives seeking to acquire a variety of equipment to support the accomplishment of the 6 core missions as described above. This included 15 ships for the navy starting in 2015, 17 fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft starting in 2015, 65 next-generation fighter aircraft starting in 2017, 10-12 maritime patrol aircraft in 2020 and an acquisition of a new family of land combat vehicles (Government of Canada 2008, 17). Supplemental objectives outlined within the *Canada First Defence Strategy* include increasing the size of the CAF from about 90,000 personnel to 100,000 personnel and providing stable and predictable funding moving forward.

A funding framework was advanced to provide the groundwork to fund these procurement programs that the document describes as a stable and predictable framework to allow the strategic allocation of resources necessary to build capabilities (Government of Canada 2008, 13). It identifies specific funding increases to four pillars deemed necessary to provide

solutions to the problems identified: personnel, equipment, readiness, and infrastructure (Government of Canada 2008, 14). This funding framework established an incremental raise in defence spending from 1.5% of GDP to 2% beginning in the 2011-12 fiscal year and with overall projected growth in spending from $18 billion in 2008-09 to over $30 billion by 2027-29 (Government of Canada 2008, 12).

The funding framework is a crucial component of the policy process that *Canada First Defence* would have to undergo if it were to be implemented. It represents the creation of the initial conditions necessary for implementation to begin identified by Pressman and Wildavsky (1979). It represents one of the final stages of influence for the federal government on the policy process before it becomes the responsibility of the DND.

Circling back to how this policy document relates to Matland's (1995) ambiguity conflict model, regarding conflict, the focus turns towards the procurement objectives and the specific decisions made regarding these decisions. The most notable example focuses on the procurement of 65 next-generation fighter aircraft for the Royal Canadian Airforce (RCAF) by 2017 (Government of Canada 2017, 17). With the condition of the fighter having to be a next-generation fighter, that only left one choice; the Lockheed Martin F-35 (Siebert 2011, 21). In 2008 when the *Canada First Defence Strategy* was first released, the F-35 was the only available fifth-generation fighter available for purchase, the F-22 Raptor, another fifth-generation fighter was not made available for international purchase by the American government (Siebert 2011, 21).

The identification of the F-35 and the attempt to procure the fighter was fraught with controversy and opposition that leaked over into the political sphere and eventually became an election issue. Canada's entire relationship with the F-35 from the moment it was announced has been met with controversy (Lagassé 2020, 45). Lagassé (2020) attributes the F-35 program as one of the reasons why the House of Commons withdrew confidence of the Conservative government (45). This controversy stemmed from the government's decision to proceed with a sole-source purchase of the F-35 (Sloan 2014, 20). This specific decision to pursue a sole-source contract became the centre of a prolonged heated debate (Sloan 2014, 20).

The F-35 returned as an election issue in 2015 as the Liberal party made it a core component of their campaign to not purchase their fighting describing the program as "wasteful" (A. Howlett et al 2022, 14). With the Liberals winning the election in 2015 and sticking true to their promise, they launched a new competition to procure a fighter under the "Future Fighter Capability Project" via an open bidding process in 2017 (A. Howlett et al 2022, 14). This process considered the Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, Super Hornet, F-35A and the Gripen E as all potential replacements for the CF-18 Hornet (A. Howlett et al 2022, 14). Dassault and Airbus both quickly dropped out of the competition ruling out the Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon as potential replacements, Boeing was later disqualified from the competition because their industrial offset package was deemed insufficient (A. Howlett et al 2022, 14).

This left the Gripen E and the F-35A as the only options left and the decision was eventually made to recommit to the F-35A[1] (A. Howlett et al 2022, 14). In early 2023, the contract to purchase the F-35A was finalized with 88 airframes purchase with the first of the aircraft set to be delivered in 2026 with full operational capacity occurring between 2032 and 2034 (Gillies 2023). This process resulted in the F-35 entering Canadian service nine years after the initial target date although with an additional 23 aircraft than initially planned. The amount of conflict inherent to the F-35 within Canada is incredibly high. A successful non-confidence vote was generated out of issues arising from the program, it was the centre of attention of a major platform of the winning political party in 2015 already meets the conditions of a high amount of conflict as per Matland (1995).

There are also additional sources of controversy stemming from the overall process used to justify the selection of the F-35 on behalf of the DND which is the implementing agency in this case. Specifically, the Parliamentary Budget Officer found that the DND had failed to provide an effective way to assess their methodology regarding the financial and risk management strategy (A. Howlett et al 2022, 13). Supplementally, the Office of the Auditor General found that the initial decision to procure the F-35 via a sole source acquisition lacked due diligence and found the government had failed to account for the full life cycle costs of the program when presenting the cost of the fleet (Lagassé 2020, 46).

[1] The F-35A is the specific variant of the F-35 that Canada chose to procure.

This combination, buildup, and sustained amount of controversy from political opponents and the media regarding in the F-35 program was significant enough for the Harper government not to proceed with procurement as it was deemed too much of a political risk (Lagassé 2020, 46). The F-35 program within the *Canada First Defence Strategy* does meet the conditions and definitions set out for policy conflict as per Matland (1995).

A notable component of the F-35 saga is that there was significant disagreement about whether the sole source contract for the F-35 was the best way to attain an agreed-upon goal. Matland (1995) defines conflict as a disagreement over policy means, providing the example that an agreed-upon policy goal can exist between multiple parties, but these parties may prefer vastly different means of accomplishing this goal (156-157). This disagreement over how to solve agreed-upon problems is at the crux of policy conflict within Matland's (1995) model.

The validity of the need for a replacement for the CF-18 was never in question, nor was any of the principles and problem definitions outlined within the *Canada First Defence Strategy* under scrutiny; rather the focus of the controversy surrounding the F-35 was if the process to choose it was the best way to fix the defined problem. The creation of the "Future Fighter Capability Project" with different parameters of considerations to produce a decision does provide validity to the defined problem of needing a new fleet of fighters, but clearly differs in how the program wanted to solve the problem. Given the extensive and long-enduring controversial relationship Canada has had with the F-35 it is safe to say that this specific

component of the *Canada First Defence Strategy* does sufficiently meet the conditions of conflict that Matland (1995) describes.

The concept of ambiguity within the *Canada First Defence Strategy* is a less clear classification than conflict. Regarding this, the problem definition, programmes, goals and procurement objectives are incredibly clear and straightforward. What remains unclear is exactly how all of these are linked in a way to solve the problems identified. Matlands (1995) distinction between the ambiguity of goals and ambiguity of means presents two different classifications (157). The ambiguity of goals is self-explanatory, but regarding the ambiguity of means, this specifically refers to clarity that the effect of the usage of a specific tool will bring to a problem (Matland 1995, 158).

The level of ambiguity is relatively low in how the *Canada First Defence Strategy* states its overall intentions and objectives, but interestingly, the linkages between exactly how some of the specific goals contribute to the accomplishment of the established objectives remained vague and unclear (Centre for Public Impact 2017). The linkage between how the tools identified are necessary in pursuit of the fulfilment of the identified core mission of the CAF remained relatively ambiguous.

Failing to outline explicitly how some of these procurement-related objectives actively solve the identified problems and accomplish the outlined objectives does indicate a level of ambiguity in critical components of the policy. It leaves the question of "how does the F-35 (or

any of the identified equipment to be procured) actively contribute to the establishment of sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic?" and other similar questions unanswered. Nossal (2016) goes as far as to state that the Conservatives never offered a strategic rationale for the F-35 and why fifth-generation fighters were needed for the CAF or even why the CF-18 would need to be replaced (74).

The inability to justify the decision to choose the F-35 by linking it as a key solution to an identified problem suggests ambiguity in crucial components of the *Canada First Defence Strategy* that sufficiently meet the conditions of ambiguity of policy design as per Matland (1995). This absence also matches with Rodman's (2020) assertion that Canada rarely produces written guidance that engages with the means, ends and ways to solve problems (276). This suggests that the procurement of the F-35 possesses some of the characteristics that have impeded the implementation of Canadian defence policy.

The ambiguity of goals is very low, it is explicitly clear what the government views the CAF's roles and capabilities to be and what equipment is necessary to accomplish them. What is not clear is the means or how the tools identified will be deployed in a manner to solve the problem. It is never clearly stated how the 65 new fighter jets that are identified as a need will fit into the environment in pursuit of a solution. The impact of the new fighter jets is never clearly stated nor how these fighter jets are going to solve the defined problems; nor are the increased capabilities of the RCAF clearly stated.

This creates a scenario where the ambiguity of means is high, the ambiguity of goals is low and the level of conflict is high. In conjunction with Matland's (1995) model, this indicates that the *Canada First Defence Strategy* occupied an environment that is either one of or a combination of political implementation and symbolic implementation (129). This points to primary constraints on successful implementation being power and coalition strength respectively (Matland 1995, 129).

The characteristic of political implementation often sees the designing of the implementation policy become the focal point of conflict (Matland 1995, 163). Essential resources are controlled by actors that may be skeptical outside the implementing organization or by actors that are opposed to the policy (Matland 1995, 163). Supplementally, one of the compelling forces that produce certain outcomes within this environment focuses on political factors (Matland 1995, 163).

Regarding the characteristics of symbolic implementation, it behaves similar to political implementation because the policies are conflictual. The primary difference is at what level the outcome is produced (Matland 1995, 169-170). Political implementation sees outcomes produced at the macro level, whereas with symbolic implementation it is produced at the micro level (Matland 1995, 170). This difference between micro and macro-level mechanisms creates a unusual situation within the defence policy environment. A micro-level environment does not necessarily exist because Matland (1995) states that a primary principle that defines a macro-level interaction is the local-level coalition strength exerting influence on the outcome (168).

Local-level interaction within the defence policy process does not exist necessarily, in a general sense local level actors do not engage with the defence policy process to the extent that they can influence outcomes to a noticeable degree. There are cases where local-level actors may influence the outcomes of defence policy but those are very specific applied examples.

Despite the local level not being applicable within this scenario, the principle of coalition strength being a determinant on the outcomes could still be valid, just applied to a macro-level of the process instead. The strength of a coalition in this case could potentially refer to the strength of the government in Parliament. The specific relationship that Matland (1995) identifies as the primary constraint may not be applicable within this context, but the principles of the coalition strength being a consideration may still apply.

Introducing Hogwood and Gunn's (1984) framework to the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, some impairing variables become immediately apparent. Drawing from the 10 conditions deemed necessary the most apparent conditions that may have not been met are as follows: circumstances external to implementing agency did not impose crippling constraints, the relationship between cause and effect is direct with few intervening links, and the combination of resources are available (Hogwood & Gunn 1984, 199-206).

The F-35 saga as outlined previously does indicate that the prolonged implementation process and the inability to meet the outlined target date suggests that the DND did have some crippling constraints placed upon its capability to implement the overall policy. This stems from

the Harper government choosing not to proceed with procurement prior to the 2015 election because of the perceived political risk attached to this program (Lagassé 2020, 46).

Although the DND is not blameless in this process, the political risk partly existed because of the actions the DND undertook. The DND is certainly culpable in creating some of the controversy surrounding the F-35 as some of the failure to properly account for costs stemmed from the DND's actions. This stems from the DND's decision to utilize the operating cost of the CF-18 rather than the much higher projected operating cost of the F-35 which presented a misleadingly low picture of the operating cost estimate for the F-35 program (Byers 2014, 9).

Despite this, the DND, CAF and RCAF all viewed the F-35 as a necessary piece of equipment for Canada but this required support from the government which after the 2015 election quickly evaporated as the Liberals won a majority in Ottawa and had a platform for cancelling the F-35 (A. Howlett et al, 2022, 14). This change in government does demonstrate that there were some extenuating circumstances that the DND did not necessarily have control over that did negatively impact their ability to implement the policy in question.

Additionally, in relation to the ambiguity of means that the *Canada First Defence Strategy* possesses, this correlates strongly to the relationship between cause and effect having to be direct. This is not the case regarding the F-35 because the link between cause and effect is not overly direct nor is it overt. The effect of implementing the F-35 and its expected impact and

outcomes in relation to the objectives outlined within the *Canada First Defence Strategy* is not readily apparent within the policy document.

The document leaves the question and other similar questions like how the F-35 would aid in exercising Canadian sovereignty within the Arctic unanswered; the audience is left to imagine reasons about how the F-35 would aid in this objective and why it was the necessary choice and right decision for the problem.

Another consideration focuses on whether the necessary conditions for successful implementation were created. The *Canada First Defence Strategy* laid out a comprehensive long-term funding plan to make the procurement of items like the F-35 possible. In 2014, the federal government re-introduced a budget freeze on the DND for a two-year period beginning in 2014-15, this budget freeze came in the wake of a three-year budget freeze beginning in 2010. By 2014, the defence budget after adjusting for inflation was smaller than it was in 2007 imposing direct impacts on the four pillars identified within *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Perry 2014, 1).

The 2014 federal budget marked the fourth time in five years that DND had its financial resources reduced, decreasing financial resources significantly (Perry 2014, 7). This negatively impacted the DND's procurement capabilities as the resources within the *Canada First Defence Strategy* that the DND was supposed to have access to were no longer accessible (Perry 2014, 10). This budget freeze and new operational parameters given to the DND significantly impacted

the national procurement budget presenting negative implications for DND's capability to procure identified equipment (Perry 2014, 10). This suggests that regarding the F-35 programs, even if the process did not garner a significant amount of attention and conflict during the attempt to procure it, the outcome desired still may not have been produced due to significant cuts to the DND's operational budget from the government.

The conditions identified by Hogwood & Gunn (1984) suggest that the DND did not necessarily have enough control over the process to be implicated in the inability to implement components of the *Canada First Defence Strategy*. While certainly, the DND helped to produce some of the controversy and conflict that produced the context that imposed some crippling constraints on their own capability, it does appear plausible that even in the absence of this conflict, programs like the F-35 may not have been able to be implemented because of other reasons.

It becomes apparent through the work of Perry (2014) that the spending freeze severely impaired the DND's capability to implement the policy objectives given which strongly suggests that the conditions necessary for successful implementation did not exist. The spending freeze imposed on DND's budget did compromise its capability to procure the equipment outlined within *Canada First Defence Strategy*. Supplementally, even in the absence of the controversy surrounding the F-35 it is likely that the target date of introduction of the fighter by 2017 would not have been met because of these budget cuts and their impact on the procurement budget.

Keeping this information in mind to McConnell's (2010) work, the F-35 program can be placed on the scale of success and failure. Regarding this scale, it becomes apparent that the F-35 exhibits characteristics that McConnell (2010) defines as precarious success (354). Refer to Table 1 for the outlined conditions associated with a state of precarious success. Regarding the specific goal of procuring new fighter jets, within the programmatic front of analysis, it is closer to a failed result than a successful result. The *Canada First Defence Strategy* kickstarted this process by identifying a specific timeline for the introduction of these new fighters into Canadian service by 2017 (Government of Canada 2008, 17). Although the initial goal of 65 fighters was exceeded, with the contract signed with Lockheed Martin earmarking 88 F-35A's for Canadian service, the introduction date for these fighters is in 2026, nine years after the initial target date (Gillies 2023).

The delay in the introduction of the F-35 and its consequences far outweighs the benefits that 23 additional fighters could provide and the new purchasing framework the Federal Government had engaged in to formally purchase the F-35. The initial estimated cost that the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer had for the F-35 program after a sole source process estimated a total USD $29.3 billion total ownership (acquisition, initial logistics set up, operating and support cost, overhaul and upgrade cost and production cost) cost for the program with an acquisition cost of about USD $148.5million per aircraft (Wellman & Yalkin 2011, 32).

After the Federal Government had launched the "Future Fighter Capability Project" the updated forecasted numbers estimated USD $85 million per aircraft (Brewster 2023). On the

surface, the decrease in the purchasing cost of the F-35 is cited because of production quantities increasing and know-how increasing, both resulting in a more efficient and cost-effective production process (Stone 2022). It could be said that waiting to purchase the F-35 allowed Canada to purchase more fighters at a lower cost and save money in the process.

That notion is not necessarily true because a direct consequence of delaying the F-35 purchase has direct implications on spending necessary to maintain the operation of the CF-18 fleet. Working around the estimate that the first F-35 would enter Canadian hands in 2026 and then achieve full operational readiness in 2033-35, an understanding of the excess cost related to the CF-18 can be formed.

The CF-18's original estimated life expectancy anticipated 2003 which represented a service life of 20 years or a fatigue-safe life of 6,000 flight hours (Public Works and Government Services Canada 2014, 12). Quick actions after the CF-18 had entered initial service extended the life expectancy of the CF-18 to 2020 and projected service life of 38 years (Public Works and Government Services Canada 2014, 12). Further extension of the CF-18 to push into 2030 is described as a technically challenging task that would cost more and require incremental investment (Public Works and Government Services Canada 2014, 14). To meet the objective of having the CF-18 fly into 2030, Public Works and Government Services Canada estimates it would cost over $1.5 billion to enable the CF-18 to fly beyond its current safe life.

This endeavour to extend the CF-18 to 2030 is described as “technically feasible”, “risky endeavour”, “high-risk” and would mean increasing uncertainty from a cost perspective (Public Works and Government Services Canada 2014, 16). Additionally, to help extend the life span of the CF-18, the Government of Canada purchased Australian F/A-18 aircraft to help close a self-described capability gap in fighter aircraft (Government of Canada 2022). This purchase came in at an estimated cost of $339.3 million to purchase these aircraft (Government of Canada 2022).

The anticipated cost of extending the life cycle of the CF-18 may not match or exceed the savings of waiting to purchase the F-35. The F-35 had gained controversy because of inaccurate cost estimates on behalf of the DND and Harper Government, so identifying an accurate cost estimate that Canada would have undergone had the purchase gone through via the sole source method is difficult. It makes an accurate comparison between the cost of acquiring the F-35 under the parameters of the sole source contract in relation to the “Future Fighter Capability Project” incredibly difficult.

In addition to the extra cost associated with extending the lifespan of the CF-18, there are additional operational consequences associated with flying them further into the future. Public Works and Government Services Canada (2014) identifies three primary components that contribute to the term they coin “operational relevance”; survivability, effectiveness and interoperability (14). Operational relevance essentially refers to the CF-18’s capabilities to fulfil mission requirements.

Due to the CF-18's design characteristics lacking low-observability (low-observability refers how observable an aircraft is to radar, generally the lower observability is more beneficial and more "survivable") and modern design features that increase the survivability of the aircraft, it is more likely to require electronic protection measures or forced to stay out of enemy territory because of advances in air defence capabilities (Public Works and Government Services Canada 2014, 14). This risk is described as making "the CF-18 increasingly deficient on *Canada First Defence Missions* (Public Works and Government Services Canada 2014, 14).

The consequences of the operational limitations of the CF-18's could amount to nothing as conceivably there is a natural path of avoidance of these environments and scenarios for the CF-18. The limitations of the operational parameters of the CF-18's must be considered though when discussing the outcome of the F-35 procurement process and trying to place it on a scale of success and failure. These limitations are a direct result of the F-35 policy process and the consequences must be considered in relation to the objectives outlined in *Canada First Defence Strategy*.

Benefits associated with restarting the procurement process via the "Future Fighter Capability Project" could possibly be negated by associated decisions regarding the extension of the life of the CF-18. Over the long term, the increased number of fighters beyond what was first identified within *Canada First Defence Strategy* that the "Future Fighter Capability Project" was able to procure could outweigh the negatives associated with the extension of the CF-18. However, in both the interim and the present, there are clear consequences to the decision to

restart the procurement process. The delayed replacement of the CF-18 necessitated additional financial commitments and sacrifices to operational capability to extend the lifespan of the CF-18's to meet the new replacement date These consequences could potentially impair the capability to produce outcomes directly related to the *Canada First Defence Strategy*.

On the programmatic front of analysis, it is abundantly clear that it does sufficiently meet the conditions for precarious success as per McConnell (2010). The *Canada First Defence Strategy* did achieve minor progress towards implementation as it did table the need to acquire new fighter jets but the process behind making this decision was quite controversial.

The process initiated did produce some damage to the group that was supposed to benefit from the policy. The DND became implicated in the government's beleaguered process to procure the fighters as it was namely criticized by the Parliamentary Budget Officer for failing to provide effective tools to analyze its methodology (A. Howlett 2022, 13). The Auditor General also criticized the DND stating that it had failed in its procedural duties describing the work done as sloppy and overly late in providing critical documents to the Auditor General (A. Howlett 2022, 13).

Supplementally, a downstream target group, the RCAF suffered some damage as well because of the F-35 procurement process. Despite getting the fighter DND and the RCAF wanted and due to the controversy that produced delays, the RCAF had its fighter capability impaired in the interim. Extending the lifespan of the CF-18's until the F-35's are ready severely

compromises the RCAF's overall capacity to fulfil some of its duties as outlined within the *Canada First Defence Strategy*.

An additional primary reason for viewing the procurement of the F-35 as precarious success relates to McConnell's (2010) requirement that often the opposition to program aims, values and means of achieving them outweighs small support (354). This is a relatively apt description to the opposition the F-35 faced during its procurement process, it helped to generate a successful vote of non-confidence in Parliament and it became a major platform in the 2015 election for the winning Liberal party in 2015. The program becoming this noteworthy in the political process indicates a substantial amount of opposition with much of it being focused on the means of the program.

The political mode of analysis as per Bovens et al (2001) does support this placement as well. The *Canada First Defence Strategy* through identifying the F-35 as the replacement for the CF-18 did bring the eventual solution to a problem to the table. The eventual selection after a beleaguered process does indicate validity to the decision to identify the specific solution found by the policy-makers of the *Canada First Defence Strategy*. While the process of making this initial decision was beleaguered, the policymakers of the *Canada First Defence Strategy* did successfully make minor progress towards implementation of the F-35 entering Canadian service. They successfully introduced the F-35 to the Canadian context as a solution to a problem and after a lot of controversies and a beleaguered political process, a decision was made to select the F-35 as the successor to the CF-18.

The characteristics of the process that the *Canada First Defence Strategy* initiated with the F-35 do place the outcome of the policy as occupying space around the concept of precarious success. This outcome placement creates the possibility of deploying the 3I+E framework to begin an analysis of why this outcome occurred in tandem with some of the information collected already in addition to supplemental information.

Keeping in mind the initial suggestions that Matland's (1995) conflict-ambiguity model produced regarding primary constraints that lead to unsuccessful implementation, it gives a general direction to point the deployment of the 3I+E framework. The overall direction that the analysis has suggested thus far is that the policymakers are the party primarily responsible for the inability to successfully implement policies. The frameworks utilized thus far suggest that the DND was not necessarily put in a position where it had the resources or environment necessary to be capable of successfully implementing the policies given.

This suggests that the primary responsibility for the outcomes is produced because of decisions policymakers undertook. Through the analysis done, the much-maligned single-source selection process that initially selected the F-35 as Canada's next fighter is the most likely stage of the policy process that produced the current outcome. This aligns with the analysis that Matland (1995) does by identifying that politics would often become the defining force on implementation within environments of political implementation. This also matches an assertion that Nossal (2016) makes regarding the procurement of the F-35 as he states that the

Conservatives willingly politicized the procurement process and viewed the F-35 as a method to boost their political fortunes (75).

Singling out the sole-source selection process that the *Canada First Defence Strategy* initiated regarding the F-35 also matches the condition of coalition strength that Matland (1995) identifies. With the F-35 being partly responsible for a successful vote of non-confidence and becoming an election issue in 2015, the policymakers responsible for the initial F-35 selection process under the *Canada First Defence Strategy* clearly lacked the necessary support on the political side of the policy process to carry out the implementation process. This points to two key factors behind the inability to implement the policy at hand; the choice of sole-source contract and the decision to politicize the F-35 program. With all of this being known and established it raises two questions that the 3I+E framework is positioned to answer; why was a sole source contract chosen with alternative methods of procurement existing and why was this process willingly politicized?

Chapter V

Explanations

The framework deployed has identified two key decisions that helped produce a state of precarious success and has opened a window to explore why these two decisions were made. The 3I+E framework is positioned to be able to interrogate both the decision to procure via a sole source contract and the decision to politicize the procurement process to reveal key influences behind these decisions. The identification of these key influences should identify some of the key considerations that result in decisions that are unable to produce the desired policy outcomes in Canadian defence policy.

The Sole-Source Contract

Institutions and Interests

Beginning with the institutional component of the framework, the most salient component regards policy legacies and policy networks. The F-35 is just the latest example of how defence procurement and the influences behind past decisions could still present themselves in this case. The natural program to examine for this component is the one that was put in place which resulted in the decision to procure the CF-18. This program was called the New Fighter

Aircraft Program which began in 1977 and ended in 1980 with the decision to select the F/A-18A Hornet (Atkinson & Nossal 1981, 533).

The New Fighter Aircraft Program's method of selection involved a competition of a variety of fighters that were viewed to meet Canada's defence requirements (Atkinson & Nossal 1981, 537). The difference in methods of procurement between the New Fighter Aircraft Program and the method chosen under the *Canada First Defence Strategy* raises the possibility of unwanted outcomes occurring in the former influencing the decision to pursue a sole source contract in the latter. Additionally, other considerations that led to the selection of the CF-18 Hornet could have been in place to influence the F-35 decision process.

The selection of the CF-18 in the 1980's mirrors the controversy that surrounded the F-35 but its capability to produce outcomes is unquestionable. Cronin (1982) when analyzing the debate hits on many of the same notes that the F-35 programs controversy focuses on, cost overruns, delivery schedule and overall capability. Most notably, it was claimed that the F-18 was three times less efficient than the F-14 in combat situations (Cronin 1982, 23). Despite these claims, with hindsight available and the outcome of the Next Fighter Aircraft program fully known, the program to procure the CF-18 is lauded as a successful program that was able to deliver CF-18's on time and on a budget (McColl 2018, 12-13).

The outcome of the New Fighter Aircraft program does lend credibility to the capability of procurement programs that adopt open competition as a method of selection to produce

desired outcomes. The outcome produced through an open competition arguably raises further questions as to why a sole source contract was decided on to procure the F-35. Clearly, the outcome produced through the competition method did not offer enough undesirable outcomes to justify a switch in procurement methods.

Despite a clear absence of a link between the New Fighter Aircraft program and the *Canada First Defence Strategy* method of procurement, another key policy legacy remains. Since the cancellation of the CF-105 Arrow in 1959, Canada has only flown American-built fighters (Nossal 2016, 73). This pattern is a result of an emphasis on interoperability with the American Air Force and this informal restriction on purchasing American-only aircraft does place limitations on potential aircraft Canada could procure (Nossal 2016, 19). This informal restriction does compromise the effectiveness of competitions to select future fighters in a way; there is no restriction on who can enter fighter competitions but there is a de facto restriction on non-American proposals.

This key policy legacy produced the logic of if the U.S armed forces were going to be primarily operating the F-35 through the 2020's and 2030's then the F-35 would be the logical fighter for Canada (Nossal 2016, 73). The identified policy legacies created a situation where a key policy legacy in tandem with identified needs and what was available left only a single option; the F-35 (Nossal 2016, 73). This policy legacy also produces an outcome where even if other fifth-generation fighters were on the market from other friendly nations, Canada would be unlikely to choose them because they are not American (Nossal 2016, 73).

All these considerations effectively negate the necessity of competition to produce a decision because policy legacies and identified criteria left a single option and justification to support the "decision" was needed. This is supported by McColl (2018) stating that the DND had already decided in 2006 that it would be purchasing the F-35 via a sole source contract (20). An established principle in the country of origin for fighters that Canada can fly does appear to be an influence on the decision to procure via a sole source contract.

While not the only variable that compromised the utility of an open competition, the policy-legacy of American-only aircraft did result in even more restrictions on an objective with additional constraining considerations. This policy legacy would have been part of the justification for the decision to proceed with a sole source contract because choosing a competition to produce a decision with given restraints and legacies would have been redundant.

There is also another key source of influence behind the decision to procure via sole source, the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) pressured the Harper government to emulate the Australian decision to procure the F-35 via a sole source contract (Nossal 2016, 73). NDHQ represents a combination of military and civilian branches in Ottawa and acts as a fusion of DND and CAF personnel (Harris & Cooke 2013). This source of influence represents a combination of both institutions and interests as with this specific action, DND is behaving as both an institution and an interest. Lavis (2013), within the concept of interests, includes public servants and under the domain of institutions includes policy networks and government structures (27-28). The occurrence here with NDHQ pressuring to procure via a sole source

shows public servants utilizing policy-networks and the government structure to influence a decision in its own self-interest.

The implementing agencies' influence on the policymakers to decide on a sole-source contract is an important piece of information because it paints a picture of circular reasoning in justification for the decision in question. NDHQ by exerting influence on the policymakers amplified some of the existing circular reasoning that already existed through the influence of policy legacies. It appears that policymakers and decision-makers would have been caught in an echo chamber of sorts with circular reasoning from all sides of the policy-making process, thus giving an impression that a sole-source contract for the F-35 was the only prudent way to proceed.

This influence from the implementing agencies on the policymakers to choose procurement via a specific method is unexpected and something that the framework created did not account for or consider as a possibility. Although ultimate responsibility for policy decisions will always come down to political decision-makers, the influence of the implementing agencies to procure via sole source is an important component of this analysis. The focus of this analysis is on explaining decisions and identifying influences on parties responsible for the outcome of decisions, not necessarily assigning responsibility to parties for the inability to produce outcomes.

Ideas

Examining how ideas influenced the decision to procure a sole source contract the F-35 case study falls into a broader examination of how Canada views the application and purpose of its defence policy. Chapnick and Stone (2020) state that "successive Canadian governments have had an image of the military as an instrument of alliance politics" (90). Furthermore, it is stated that the Canadian government will rarely make strategic decisions regarding defence policy entirely independently because of the bilateral ties with the United States (Chapnick & Stone 2020, 90).

This reality and idea of how defence policy is supposed to function is formed through Canada's role in alliances like NATO and NORAD where this membership is a means of pursuing defence outcomes (Chapnick & Stone 2020, 90). In relation to Bovens et al (2001) distinctions between programmatic outcomes and political outcomes, Canada's own idea of how defence policy functions create a scenario where it can sacrifice the programmatic outcomes in pursuit of the political outcomes regarding defence policy.

This influence from alliance partners to proceed with certain decisions may have also contributed to the already existing circular reasoning that surrounded the policymakers. Policymakers could have seen other alliance members decide to procure the F-35 in increasing numbers and use their decisions as justification or viewed it as external pressure to further buy into the F-35 program. The dealignment between programmatic-based outcomes and political

outcomes regarding defence policy suggests that decisions revolving around the F-35 may not have solely considered programmatic-based outcomes in the implementation of these policies.

A compromise in the intended purpose of policy decisions could explain some of the influence to proceed with a sole source contract. The idea that Canada's defence policy functions as a tool to maintain other external relationships amongst other allied nations create the possibility where military procurement decisions are made to maintain relationships first and the outcomes in relation to Canada including the capability to successfully implement are a secondary priority.

It could be true that the idea that policymakers view defence policy primarily to achieve political objectives in the international realm rather than resulting in decisions that compromised the capability to implement the policy. This idea creates the possibility that sacrifices to the capability to implement policy were made because the benefits in relation to the maintenance of crucial alliance relationships outweighed the cost of the inability to implement policy and the capability to produce desired outcomes.

A causal relationship in this regard is hard to firmly establish because to sufficiently prove that these decisions were influenced by concerns outside the realm of pure implementation requires examination of briefing notes and direct statements from those involved in the decision-making process. Proving a firm causal relationship between the idea and function of Canadian defence policy as a tool to pursue other political means is outside the scope of this project but a

correlation exists. Nonetheless, this idea that policymakers have regarding Canadian defence policy would have influenced the decisions made regarding the F-35 program; the extent of which and the overall impact of this idea though is unknown and should be explored further.

External

It is clear there was a lot of impetus from multiple parties within the policy process to select the F-35. It raises the question as to why so many actors from different backgrounds had all landed on the same answer as the solution to the problem. The F-35 was not the only American fighter on the market, the F/A-18 Super Hornet produced by Boeing was available for purchase but was never considered and rarely if at all mentioned during this initial selection of the F-35 under the Harper Government. It raises the question as to why this was the case and how the entire policy environment produced the same consistent answer despite various considerations.

The answer to this may lie in the nature of the development of the F-35. The F-35 is the product of the Joint Strike Fighter program, a fighter program the American government started that also deliberately involved international partners to lower costs (Antill & Ito 2012, 17). The international partners involved include the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Turkey all of which are involved in NATO (Antill & Ito 2012, 17). The international nature of the F-35 program explains the impetus behind both the policymakers and the implementing agencies all identifying the F-35 as the only choice for Canada.

For the DND and CAF the F-35 made sense because they place priority on their fighter fleet being interoperable with the U.S Air Force (Nossal 2016, 19). With the F-35 slated to be the mainstay fighter of not only the U.S Air Force but also numerous NATO allies, the F-35 simply just made sense. An American-built fighter that wasn't just only interoperable with the U.S Air Force but also the U.S Navy and the majority of NATO would have made the F-35 the obvious and only choice for DND and CAF given their considerations.

Furthermore, for the policymakers and the Canadian government, given their conception that defence policy also functions to maintain alliance relationships, the connection is clear. Buying into the F-35 program and maintaining involvement in a program which had many key NATO allies involved is an obvious way to maintain alliance-based relationships. Bailing out of the program and pursuing other options could have compromised these alliance-based relationships that Canada values.

Involvement and the procurement of the F-35 to the policymakers represented an opportunity to pursue both defence procurement-related objectives and further relationships with alliance members simultaneously. For a country where multiple governments have viewed defence policy as a tool to accomplish foreign policy-related objectives, the F-35 is an increasingly obvious option because it killed two birds with one stone.

The context of the F-35 program has some correlated links to some behaviours/influences identified that produced a decision to procure via a sole-source contract. The nature and context

of the F-35 program crafted the positions identified via the 3I+E framework as key influences behind the decisions made. It helps explain why multiple parties involved in the policy process for defence policy came to the same conclusion, the F-35 managed to check off the boxes for all parties involved and satisfy the various different conditions that influenced the respective positions.

Preliminary Summary

Overall, examining the influences behind the decision to procure a sole-source contract has produced a few plausible causes. It appears likely that the policymakers were influenced to some extent by some groupthink/circular reasoning surrounding the decision regarding the F-35. Influence from the implementing agencies to specifically procure via a sole-source contract in tandem with an environment where the F-35 was the only choice that met the requirements identified by the CAF would have amplified the decision to procure via sole source. These variables and considerations paint a picture of circular reasoning or groupthink occurring regarding the decision to procure via a sole source contract.

This can also explain some of the missteps on behalf of both the DND and the federal government's procedure regarding its attempts to proceed with a sole-source contract. Due diligence and accurate cost forecasting errors may have been overlooked or ignored because everyone involved in the process was fully aware a decision was made regardless of cost and other variables and that these errors would have no impact on decision making. The utility of

these procedural steps became negated because no matter what occurred the decision would remain the same.

These influences identified by the 3I+E framework provide an explanation for the decision to procure via a sole source contract. The environment the considerations and influence the policymakers had to consider negated any need for a competition to procure a replacement for the CF-18's. From the perspective of the policymakers, the policy environment all pointed at the F-35 as the right choice even if competition existed that fit the parameters laid out by the CAF. With competition often being more expensive and more time-consuming than sole-source contracts this would have served as further justification to procure via a sole-source contract because no decision regarding which fighter Canada would fly was necessary (Shimooka 2022).

Politicization of Procurement

Deploying the 3I+E framework to analyze the decision to wilfully politicize the procurement process yielded insufficient explanation. The only component of the 3I+E framework that provided links to the decisions made was the Institutions component and the influence of policy legacies. Ideas, Interests and External factors all produced insufficient connections that are incredibly difficult to identify let alone establish a relationship between them. The 3I+E framework in this specific application is not the right framework to analyze the decision in question, the politicization of the procurement process, because of its inability to produce possible explanations for such a decision.

McColl (2018) states that within Canadian politics, getting defence procurement right doesn't win many votes and being critical of the sitting government's defence policy doesn't lose many votes (13). With this precedent being set it appears that it would be in the best interest of the sitting government to keep a procurement project de-politicized to the best of its capability because there is little to be gained but a lot that could be lost. Political opponents are not necessarily harmed by attacking procurement decisions whereas the sitting government has little to gain by politicizing procurement decisions.

There is tangible evidence to support this claim through a comparison with the Sea King replacement program procurement becoming an election issue (McColl 2016, 13). This program was initiated under the Pierre Trudeau government and then furthered to completion by the Mulroney government (McColl 2016, 13). An order had been placed for the replacements, but the end of the Cold War created an opportunity for the political opponents of the Mulroney government to make it an election issue in 1993 under the guise of excessive spending (McColl 2016, 13). The Chrétien Liberals even went so far as promising to cancel the program if they were elected (McColl 2016, 13).

The Chrétien government would go on to win the 1993 election in a landslide and the Sea King replacement program was cancelled immediately (McColl 2016, 13). A few years later in 2004 the Chrétien government would circle back on its decision to cancel the procurement of a new helicopter and proceed with the original decision that the Mulroney government produced under the guise of a new competition (McColl 2016, 13). The replacement for the Sea Kings was

supposed to be in full service and fully delivered by 2011 but instead first deliveries would occur in 2015, with the final deliveries occurring in 2021 and at a cost of $200 million overbudget (McColl 2016, 14).

The story of the Sea King replacement hits on the same notes as the F-35 decision and the analogy is clear. With such a clear example of the politicization of procurement having severe political consequences and impairment of implementation, it makes the Conservative's decision to willfully politicize the F-35's sole source procurement process even more baffling. There is no managerial inertia or organizational inertia to explain the policymakers' decision to willfully politicize this project.

The policy legacy of the Sea King replacement would strongly suggest steering clear of politicizing a procurement project for a policymaker. A procurement program oriented around replacing ageing equipment resulting in a 30-year delay, going over budget and resulting in political consequences would strongly suggest avoiding politicizing procurement. Given this, the Conservative Party's decision to wilfully politicize the F-35 procurement is unexplainable given this mode of analysis. It becomes even more baffling when the Sea King program is contextualized in relation to the F-35 program. This program would have been in recent memory and still ongoing when the decision to politicize the F-35 program occurred. For the Conservatives to take the same steps that the Mulroney government undertook regarding the procurement of equipment when the result for the latter was fatal is unexplainable.

The sheer inability to produce even a correlation between the actions that took place and the considerations that should have influenced these actions strongly suggests that the 3I+E framework is not the right framework to answer this question. The additional considerations of ideas, interests and external factors provided little or no tangible connection to being able to explain the decision to politicize the procurement of the F-35.

An additional unclear element when examining the decision to politicize the procurement process circles back to the decision to procure via a sole-source contract. Both decisions are most likely tied together in some way, much of the political resistance to the F-35 focused on the sole source contract. It creates a question of whether the decision to politicize the procurement of the F-35 was in response to the political resistance that the sole-source contract created or if the political resistance to the sole-source contract was created in response to the decision to procure via a sole-source contract. The relationship between these two causes mirrors the question of "Which came first the chicken or the egg?" and without access to primary sources regarding the decision to politicize the procurement process it's impossible to examine the relationship at hand.

Furthermore, explaining this decision would require an inside look at the decision-making process from those involved to provide a causal explanation of this decision. The required steps to provide a causal explanation behind the decision to politicize the procurement process of the F-35 program are simply out of the scope for this project. This is an area that should be examined much further because this specific decision did have implications on the implementation process of the F-35 that did produce an outcome of precarious success.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

The overall findings of this project have identified two likely primary causes behind the lengthy delays in the procurement of the F-35 and were able to produce explanations for one of these decisions. While not able to produce explanations for all the decisions identified, this project was still able to produce a sufficient explanation for one of the critical decisions that produced a state of precarious success. It is likely that the decisions to proceed with a sole-source contract and to politicize the procurement of the F-35 contributed to the delays that the F-35 has faced. The explanations that identified the influences behind the former decision present tangible relationships that can be extrapolated to the general Canadian defence policy environment.

Specifically, the influence that the idea of Canada's defence policy functioning as a tool to maintain relationships amongst alliances has considerable implications regarding the overall capability to implement defence policy. This idea has an impact on the capability to successfully pursue procurement outcomes because of the dilution of objectives and its impact on other components of defence policy must be examined. If it can influence decisions to deliberately sacrifice the implementation of procurement objectives in favour of the maintenance of relationships, an analysis of whether this is a prudent course of action should be done.

Despite not being able to present explanations for one of the decisions that impeded the implementation of the F-35, this process did identify a decision and variable that caused this

outcome. Furthermore, an analysis of the specific decision to politicize the F-35 program must be done. A decision to politicize a procurement program is one that has been made numerous times and it is clearly a decision that does not produce conducive results regarding the implementation or political support. Providing a causal explanation as to why this specific decision was made and identifying the key considerations that influenced the policymakers to make this decision is important. This can provide further explanation for an occurrence that seemingly happens regularly with the same results.

Bibliography

Abdullahi, Muhammad, and Nooraini Othman. 2020. “Bridging the Gap between Policy Intent and Implementation.” Vol. 6.

Amado, Gilles, and Anthony Ambrose. 2018. *The Transitional Approach to Change.* First edit. The Harold Bridger Transitional Series. Routledge. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9546775&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Antill, Peter D, and Pete Ito. 2012. “The UK and the Joint Strike Fighter: The Trials and Tribulations of International Collaborative Procurement.” *International Journal* 68 (1): 13. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edscpi&AN=edscpi.A331079256&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Asen, Robert. 2010. “Reflections on the Role of Rhetoric in Public Policy.” *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 13 (1): 121–43. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.41955593&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Atkinson, Michael M., and Kim Richard Nossal. 1981. “Bureaucratic Politics and the New Fighter Aircraft Decisions.” *Canadian Public Administration* 24 (4): 531–62. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.1981.tb00348.x.

Baines, Victoria. 2021. *Rhetoric of Insecurity : The Language of Danger, Fear and Safety in National and International Contexts.* Routledge. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9672539&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Bercuson, David J. 2018. *The Context of Canadian Defence Policy.* Policy Update. Canadian Global Affairs Institute. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9327670&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Bovens, Mark, Paul ’t Hart, and B Guy Peters. 2001. “Success and Failure in Public Governance : A Comparative Analysis.”

Brewster, Murray. 2023. “Federal Government Inks Deal to Buy Fleet of F-35 Fighter Jets.” *CBC News*, January 9, 2023. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-f35-fighter-jet-deal-1.6707769.

Byers, M, and K Franks. 2014. “Unmanned and Unnecessary: Canada’s Proposed Procurement of UAVs.” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 20 (3): 271–90. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2014.934866.

Byers, Michael. 2014. *The Plane That Ate the Canadian Military : Life-Cycle Cost of F-35 Fleet Could Reach $126 Billion.* Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives = Centre canadien de politiques alternatives. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9377550&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Campagna, Palmiro. 2019. *The Avro Arrow : For the Record.* Dundurn. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.8654662&site=eds-live&scope=site.

CBC News. 2007. "Harper Announces Northern Deep-Sea Port, Training Site," August 10, 2007. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/harper-announces-northern-deep-sea-port-training-site-1.644982.

Centre for Public Impact. 2017. "The Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS)." https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/canada-first-defence-strategy-cfds#:~:text=The Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) was published by the,%2C equipment%2C readiness and infrastructure.

Chapman, Bert. 2019. "The Geopolitics of Canadian Defense White Papers: Lofty Rhetoric and Limited Results." *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations* 11 (1): 7–40. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edscee&AN=edscee.777160&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Charron, Andrea, and James Fergusson. 2018. *Arctic Sovereignty : Preoccupation vs. Homeland Governance and Defence.* Policy Perspective. Canadian Global Affairs Institute. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9327685&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Charron, Andrea, and James Fregusson. 2020. "From Policy and Strategy to Outcomes BT - Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice." In , edited by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, 81–97. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26403-1_6.

Coleman, Anna, Jenny Billings, Pauline Allen, Rasa Mikelyte, Sarah Croke, Julie Macinnes, And Kath Checkland. 2021. "Ambiguity and Conflict in Policy Implementation: The Case of the New Care Models (Vanguard) Programme in England." *Journal of Social Policy* 50 (2): 285–304. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279420000082.

Coleman, Anna, Jenny Billings, Pauline Allen, Rasa Mikelyte, Sarah Croke, Julie MacInnes, and Kath Checkland. 2021. "Ambiguity and Conflict in Policy Implementation: The Case of the New Care Models (Vanguard) Programme in England." *Journal of Social Policy* 50 (2): 285–304. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279420000082.

Cronin, M. 1982. "A Case of Hornets: The Controversial CF-18a." *American Review of Canadian Studies* 12 (3): 17–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/02722018209480755.

Dean, Ryan, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and Adam Lajeunesse. 2014. “Canadian Arctic Defence Policy: A Synthesis of Key Documents, 1970-2013,” 1970–2013. https://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/dcass/82112.pdf.

Dempster, Douglas. 2020. “From Policy and Strategy to Outcomes BT - Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice.” In , edited by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, 81–97. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26403-1_6.

Duhaime, Gérard, and Nick Bernard. 2008. *Arctic Food Security.* Occasional Publication: No. 58. CCI Press, University of Alberta. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.4360766&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Dunlop, Claire. 2020. *Policy Learning and Policy Failure.* New Perspectives in Policy and Politics. Policy Press. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.8901334&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Dunsire, Andrew. 1978. *The Execution Process.* Government and Administration Series. M. Robertson. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.276532&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Elliot-Meisel, Elizabeth. 2009. “Politics, Pride, and Precedent: The United States and Canada in the Northwest Passage.” *Ocean Development and International Law* 40 (2): 204–32. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.ocdev40.18&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Elmore, Richard F. 1979. “Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy Decisions.” *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (4): 601–16. https://doi.org/10.2307/2149628.

Fischer, Frank. 2021. *Truth and Post-Truth in Public Policy : Interpreting the Arguments.* Cambridge Elements. Elements in Public Policy. Cambridge University Press. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9829701&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Fortin, M.A. 2016. “The Harper Conservatives’ Arctic Policy: Did It Really Make a Difference?” https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/318/305/fortin.pdf.

Geddert, Jeremy Seth. 2019. “Right of (Northwest) Passage: Toward a Responsible Canadian Arctic Sovereignty.” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 52 (3): 595–612. http://10.0.3.249/S0008423919000052.

Gillies, Rob. 2023. “Canada Finalizes Agreement to Buy 88 US F-35 Fighter Jets.” *US News Online*. Associated Press DBA Press Association.

https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nsm&AN=APb50992f6241dd6ec8614ed385cc10528&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Gottweis, Herbert. 2012. “Political Rhetoric and Stem Cell Policy in the United States:” In *The Argumentative Turn Revisited*, edited by Frank Fischer and Herbert Gottweis, 211–35. Public Policy as Communicative Practice. Duke University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv11smfm4.10.

Government of Canada. 2008. “Canada First Defence Strategy.” *Strategy*. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/canada-first-defence-strategy-complete-document.html.

Government of Canada. 2022. “Supplementing the CF-18 Fleet.” https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/procurement/fighter-jets/supplementing-cf-18-fleet.html#shr-pg0.

Griffiths, Franklyn. 1987. *Politics of the Northwest Passage.* McGill-Queen’s University Press. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.7398527&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Grimm, Dieter, and Belinda Cooper. 2015. *Sovereignty : The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept.* Columbia Studies in Political Thought/Political History. Columbia University Press. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.7652961&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Harris, Stephen, and O.a. Cooke. 2013. “Department of National Defence.” https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/department-of-national-defence.

Hartfiel, Robert Michael. 2010. “Planning without Guidance: Canadian Defence Policy and Planning, 1993–2004.” *Canadian Public Administration* 53 (3): 323–49. http://10.0.4.87/j.1754-7121.2010.00139.x.

Hill, Christopher. 1993. “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role.” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31 (3): 305–28. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.jcmks31.27&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Hoffman, F G. 2014. “Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations.” *Orbis* 58 (4): 472–85. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2014.08.002.

Hogwood, Brian W, and Lewis A Gunn. 1984. *Policy Analysis for the Real World.* Oxford University Press. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.1929899&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Hossain, Kamrul, Lena Maria Nilsson, and Thora Martina Herrmann. 2021. *Food Security in the High North : Contemporary Challenges across the Circumpolar Region.* Routledge Research in Polar Regions. Routledge. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9238915&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Howlett, A (1), A R (2) Migone, and M (3) Howlett. 2022. "The Politics of Military Procurement: The F-35 Purchasing Process in Canada and Australia Compared." *Defence Studies*, January. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2137494.

Howlett, Michael, M Ramesh, and Xun Wu. 2015. "Understanding the Persistence of Policy Failures: The Role of Politics, Governance and Uncertainty." *Public Policy and Administration* 30 (3–4): 209–20. https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076715593139.

Hudson, Bob, David Hunter, and Stephen Peckham. 2019. "Policy Failure and the Policy-Implementation Gap: Can Policy Support Programs Help?" *Policy Design and Practice* 2 (1): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/25741292.2018.1540378.

Huebert, R. 1995. "Polar Vision or Tunnel Vision the Making of Canadian Arctic Waters Policy. The Making of Canadian Arctic Waters Policy." *Marine Policy* 19 (4): 343–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/0308-597X(95)00011-T.

Huebert, Robert N. 2009. *Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World.* Foreign Policy for Canada's Tomorrow: No. 4. Canadian International Council. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9341682&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Huebert, Robert N, John Robert Ferris, and P Whitney Lackenbauer. 2012. *Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security : Historical Perspectives.* Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies. Occasional Paper: 2011 No. 4. Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9345980&site=eds-live&scope=site.

James, Carolyn C, and Patrick James. 2014. "Canada, the United States and Arctic Sovereignty: Architecture Without Building?" *American Review of Canadian Studies* 44 (2): 187–204. http://10.0.4.56/02722011.2014.914048.

James, Patrick. 2014. "Canada and Conflict: A Hard-Hitting Look at Canadian Security Post-9/11, from the Afghanistan War to US Relations and Arctic Sovereignty." *International Journal* 69 (2): 260–62. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.intj69.33&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Juneau, Thomas, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic. 2020. “From Policy and Strategy to Outcomes BT - Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice.” In , edited by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, 81–97. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26403-1_6.

Kenney, Gerard I. 2006. *Dangerous Passage : Issues in the Arctic.* Dundurn. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.7400889&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Kerr, Donna H. 1976. “The Logic of ‘Policy’ and Successful Policies.” *Policy Sciences* 7 (3): 351–63. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.4531649&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Kilford, Christopher. 2017. *Canada’s New Defence Policy : A Huge Step in the Right Direction.* Conference of Defence Associations Institute. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9359088&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Koskenniemi, Martti. 2002. *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations : The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960.* Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures. Cambridge University Press. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.8420840&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Kusi-Ampofo, Owuraku, John Church, Charles Conteh, and B Timothy Heinmiller. 2015. “Resistance and Change: A Multiple Streams Approach to Understanding Health Policy Making in Ghana.” *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 40 (1): 195–219. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-2854711.

Lackenbauer, P Whitney. 2013. *If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Break It : Expanding and Enhancing the Canadian Rangers.* Working Papers on Arctic Security: No. 6. Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9376424&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Lagassé, Philippe. 2013. *Recapitalizing the Canadian Forces’ Major Fleets : Assessing Lingering Controversies and Challenges.* Strategic Studies Working Group Papers. Canadian International Council = Conseil international du Canada. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9374991&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Lagassé, Philippe. 2020. “From Policy and Strategy to Outcomes BT - Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice.” In , edited by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, 81–97. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26403-1_6.

Lajeunesse, Adam. 2015. *The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic : Purpose, Capabilities, and Requirements.* Policy Paper (Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute). Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9312716&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Landriault, Mathieu. 2016. "Public Opinion on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security." *Arctic* 69 (2): 160–68. https://doi.org/10.14430/arctic4563.

Landriault, Mathieu, and Paul Minard. 2016. "Does Standing up for Sovereignty Pay off Politically - Arctic Military Announcements and Governing Party Support in Canada from 2006 to 2014." *International Journal* 71 (1): 41–61. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.intj71.7&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Lang, Eugene. 2017. "The Shelf Life of Defence White Papers." *Global Affairs*. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/june-2017/shelf-life-defence-white-papers/.

Lavis, John N. 2013. *Paradigm Freeze: Why It Is So Hard to Reform Health-Care Policy in Canada*. Edited by Harvey Lazar, John N. Lavis, Pierre- Gerlier Forest, and John Church. *Canadian Public Administration-Administration Publique Du Canada*. Queen's Policy Studies Series. Insitute of Intergovernmental Relations. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.7612866&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Lavis, John N, Suzanne E Ross, Jeremiah E Hurley, Joanne M Hohenadel, Gregory L Stoddart, Christel A Woodward, and Julia Abelson. 2002. "Examining the Role of Health Services Research in Public Policymaking." *The Milbank Quarterly* 80 (1): 125–54. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.3350497&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Macdonald, George. 2009. *The Canada First Defence Strategy : One Year Later.* Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9327453&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Macdonald, George. 2020. "From Policy and Strategy to Outcomes BT - Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice." In , edited by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, 81–97. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26403-1_6.

Marsh, Howard. 1990. "Canadian Defence Policy: Why a History of Reversals." *DTIC AND NTIS*. 1990-04. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsoai&AN=edsoai.ocn832088515&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Massie, Justin, and Srdjan Vucetic. 2020. “From Policy and Strategy to Outcomes BT - Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice.” In , edited by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, 81–97. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26403-1_6.

Matland, Richard E. 1995. “Synthesizing the Implementation Literature: The Ambiguity-Conflict Model of Policy Implementation.” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART* 5 (2): 145–74. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.1181674&site=eds-live&scope=site.

McColl, Alexander. 2018. “CF-39 Arrow II: A Swedish Solution to the CF-18 Replacement Problem.” https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/34935.

McConnell, Allan. 2015. “What Is Policy Failure? A Primer to Help Navigate the Maze.” *Public Policy and Administration* 30 (3–4): 221-242–242. https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076714565416.

McConnell, Allan. 2010. “Policy Success, Policy Failure and Grey Areas In-Between.” *Journal of Public Policy* 30 (3): 345–62. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.40925891&site=eds-live&scope=site.

McCormack, Michael. 2020. “More than Words: Securitization and Policymaking in the Canadian Arctic under Stephen Harper.” *American Review of Canadian Studies JN - American Review of Canadian Studies* 50 (4): 436–60. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lfh&AN=149307301&site=eds-live&scope=site.

McDorman, Ted L. 1986. “In the Wake of the Polar Sea: Canadian Jurisdiction and the Northwest Passage.” *Marine Policy* 10 (4): 243. http://10.0.3.248/0308-597X(86)90001-1.

Měřičková, Zuzana. 2022. “Canadian Discourse and Emotions on Terrorism: How Canadian Prime Ministers Speak about Terrorism since 9/11.” *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 16 (1): 70–95. https://doi.org/10.51870/YTRT8071.

Nossal, Kim Richard. 2016. *Charlie Foxtrot : Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada.* Point of View. Dundurn. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.7634404&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Palfrey, Colin. 2000. *Key Concepts in Health Care Policy and Planning : An Introductory Text.* Macmillan Press. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.2908143&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Perry, David. 2015. *The Growing Gap between Defence Ends and Means : The Disconnect between the Canada First Defence Strategy and the Current Defence Budget.* Vimy Paper = Cahier Vimy: 19. CDA Institute = Institut de la CAD. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.9306124&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Pomey, Marie-Pascale, Steve Morgan, John Church, Pierre-Gerlier Forest, John N Lavis, Tom McIntosh, Neale Smith, Jennifer Petrela, Elisabeth Martin, and Sarah Dobson. 2010. "Do Provincial Drug Benefit Initiatives Create an Effective Policy Lab? The Evidence from Canada." *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 35 (5): 705–42. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-2010-025.

Pressman, Jeffrey L, and Aaron B Wildavsky. 1973. *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland, or, Why It's Amazing That Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals* . The Oakland Project Series. University of California Press. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.15687&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Pressman, Jeffrey L, and Aaron B Wildavsky. 1979. *Implementation : How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland : Or, Why It's Amazing That Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Moral*. 2d ed. The Oakland Project Series. University of California Press. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.284872&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Public Services and Procurement Canada. 2023. "Canada Finalizes Agreement to Purchase New Fighter Jets for Royal Canadian Air Force." https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-procurement/news/2023/01/canada-finalizes-agreement-to-purchase-new-fighter-jets-for-royal-canadian-air-force.html.

Public Works and Government Services Canada. 2014. *Evaluation of Options for the Replacement of the CF-18 Fighter Fleet : Summary Report.* Public Works and Government Services Canada. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.6810793&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Rodman, Lindsay. 2020. "From Policy and Strategy to Outcomes BT - Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice." In , edited by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, 81–97. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26403-1_6.

Rosli, Ainurul, Federica Rossi Birkbeck, and Federica Rossi. 2014. "CIMR Research Working Paper Series Explaining the Gap between Policy Aspirations and Implementation: The Case

of University Knowledge Transfer Policy in the United Kingdom Explaining the Gap between Policy Aspirations and Implementation: The Case of University Knowledge Transfer Policy in the United Kingdom."

Roston, Matt. 2009. "The Northwest Passage's Emergence As an International Highway." *Southwestern Journal of International Law*. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lgs&AN=502074523&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Ruskin, Brett. "How the Canadian Navy Plans to Use Its Newest Warship." *CBC News*, August . https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/hmcs-harry-dewolf-captain-patrolling-the-arctic-1.4247629.

Sandhu, Ravinder, Guneet Saini, and Elizabeth Alvarez. 2021. "Using the 3I+E Framework to Assess Provincial Policy Decisions for the Sale of Cannabis in Ontario, Saskatchewan and Quebec." *University of Toronto Journal of Public Health* 2 (1): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.33137/utjph.v2i1.34726.

Sebastian, C. 2013. "New Power, New Priorities: The Effects of UNCLOS on Canadian Arctic Foreign Policy." *Polar Journal* 3 (1): 136–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2013.783279.

Shimooka, Richard. 2022. "Richard Shimooka : Politics Delayed F-35 Choice by over a Decade , Leaving Canada Worse Off."

Siebert, John. 2011. "What's Driving the F-35 Procurement? 'Requirements,' Say the Conservatives, but Evidence, Including the Canada First Defence Strategy, Suggests Otherwise." *Ploughshares Monitor* 32 (1): 20. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edscpi&AN=edscpi.A256460030&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Sloan, Elinor. 2014. "Something Has to Give: Why Delays Are the New Reality of Canada's Defence Procurement Strategy." *The School of Public Policy Publications*, October, 1–54. https://doi.org/10.11575/sppp.v7i0.42485.

Stein, Daniel. 2018. "Protecting the Arctic Environment from Northwest Passage Shipping in the Era of Climate Change." *Tulane Environmental Law Journal* 32 (2): 239–56. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.tulev32.17&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Stein, Janice, and J Eugene Lang. 2008. *The Unexpected War : Canada in Kandahar.* Penguin. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.4798208&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Stone, J Craig, and Binyam Solomon*. 2005. "Canadian Defence Policy and Spending." *Defence and Peace Economics* 16 (3): 145–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242690500123414.

Stone, Mike. 2022. “Exclusive: Pentagon Nears F-35 Jet Deal Worth about $30 Bln - Sources.” *Reuters*, July 18, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/exclusive-pentagon-nears-f-35-jet-deal-worth-about-30-billion-sources-2022-07-18/#:~:text=The first F-35A cost,million as it gained buyers.

Story, Donald., and Russell Isinger. 2007. “The Origins of the Cancellation of Canada’s Avro CF-105 Arrow Fighter Program: A Failure of Strategy.” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30 (6): 1025–50. http://10.0.4.56/01402390701676535.

Theriault, Sophie. 2009. “Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: Inuit People’s Food Security in the Age of Climate Change and Arctic Melting.” *Southwestern Journal of International Law* 15 (2): 223–50. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.sjlta15.15&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Meter, Donald S Van, and Carl E Van Horn. 1975. “THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS.” *Administration & Society* 6 (4): 445. http://10.0.4.153/009539977500600404.

Weltman, Peter, and Tolga R Yalkin. 2011. *An Estimate of the Fiscal Impact of Canada’s Proposed Acquistion of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. [Electronic Resource]*. Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.6474575&site=eds-live&scope=site.

Wood-Donnelly, Corine. 2019. *Performing Arctic Sovereignty : Policy and Visual Narratives.* Routledge Research in Polar Regions. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. https://login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat03710a&AN=alb.8835230&site=eds-live&scope=site.